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I analyze a rare disasters economy that yields a measure of the risk neutral probability
of a macroeconomic disaster, p§t . A large panel of options data provides strong evidence
that p§t is the single factor driving option-implied jump risk measures in the cross section
of firms. This is a core assumption of the rare disasters paradigm. A number of empirical
patterns further support the interpretation of p§t as the risk-neutral likelihood of a disaster.
First, standard forecasting regressions reveal that increases in p§t lead to economic down-
turns. Second, disaster risk is priced in the cross section of U.S. equity returns. A zero-cost
equity portfolio with exposure to disasters earns risk-adjusted returns of 7.6% per year. Fi-
nally, a calibrated version of the model reasonably matches the: (i) sensitivity of the aggre-
gate stockmarket to changes in the likelihood of a disaster and (ii) loss rates of disaster risky
stocks during the 2008 financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
A longstanding puzzle inmacroeconomics andfinancial economics is that consumption growth
is not volatile enough to justify why the aggregate stock market earns large returns in excess of
riskless bonds. In response, Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) argue that the economy is subject to
rare “disasters” such as wars and depressions; in turn, the risk premium on stocks is not sur-
prising because stocks are highly exposed to these rare events.
While this argument is simple, the empirical assessment of these models has proved more
controversial. Barro and Ursua (2008) use personal consumption data to estimate the average
likelihood and severity of a crisis, finding evidence that supports the original Rietz (1988) and
Barro (2006) claim. Nakamura et al. (2013) show that rare disasters can explain stock market
performance even if disasters unfold over a number of years and are followed by economic
recoveries. On the other hand,many argue that rare disastermodels are not supported by equity
or options data (Julliard and Ghosh (2012), Backus, Chernov, andMartin (2011)), and that more
generally, the probability of a disaster may not even be identifiable (Chen et al. (2015)).
A critical assumption made by all of the aforementioned research is that the frequency of
disasters is time-invariant. However, Gabaix (2012) and Seo and Wachter (2015) show theo-
retically that much of the empirical debate can be resolved by allowing the likelihood and/or
severity of a disaster to be time varying. Gabaix (2012) also demonstrates that variable disasters
can explain a host of other asset pricing patterns like the volatility of price-dividend ratios and
return predictability. Nonetheless, there is not a great deal of evidence on whether disasters are
indeed time-varying, as this variation is notoriously difficult to estimate. Moreover, the ability
to detect time-series variation in the likelihood of a disaster is important because this yields
additional ways to evaluate the models outside of matching unconditional average returns.
In this paper, I develop a novel approach to measure time-series variation in the Arrow-
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Debreu state price of a disaster, or the so-called “risk-neutral” probability of a disaster. Instead
of using aggregate stock price or macroeconomic data as in much of the previous work, my
strategy takes advantage of information contained in the cross section of option and equity
returns. I focus on the risk-neutral probability of a disaster because option data contains in-
formation on the risk-neutral process that cannot be translated to realized likelihoods without
making stronger assumptions on preferences.1 This is not particularly limiting given that it is
the risk-neutral likelihood of a disaster that dictates future economic outcomes (e.g. investment
decisions or asset returns).
The high-level logic ofmy approach is as follows. The core assumption of rare disastermod-
els is that all assets in the economy are exposed to an aggregate jump-risk factor. If this is the
case, then time-series variation in the tails of individual asset returns should be driven by this
single factor, even though cross-sectionally some assets are more exposed to the tail event than
others. I formalize this logic in the context of a standard rare disasters model, which delivers
a straightforward way to use stock option prices to diagnose the factor structure of asset tails.
Options are a natural asset class for this problem because they are a forward-looking measure
of firm performance and do not require realizations of disasters to occur. Another advantage of
my approach is that I use a non-parametric measure of jump risk in options. This lets me test
for the presence of a time-varying disaster process without imposing any a priori structure on
the data.
Consistent with the basic premise of the model, a single factor captures 50% of the time-
series variation in a large panel of option-implied jump measures. Using the model, I inter-
pret this factor as measuring temporal variation in the risk-neutral probability of a disaster, p§t .
Qualitatively, p§t evolves as expected, peaking during tumultuous times like the 2003 Iraq War
1i.e. I estimate time-series variation of the (scaled) Arrow-Debreu security that only pays off in the disaster state,
not the actual likelihood of this state.
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and the 2008 U.S. financial crisis. As posited in the literature, p§t is clearly time-varying and
persistent, with an AR(1) coefficient of nearly 0.91 for monthly data. Importantly, I do not pin
down the mean of p§t , but its time-series variation is still valuable because rare disaster models
contain many predictions based only on the time-series properties of disaster risk.
For instance, Gourio (2012) and Kilic and Wachter (2015) build general equilibrium mod-
els where an exogenous increase in the likelihood of a disaster leads to endogenous declines in
macroeconomic activity, even without the realization of a disaster. Consistent with these mod-
els, from April 1996 to April 2015, an increase in p§t forecasts significant reductions in employ-
ment, industrial production, total capacity utilization, and manufacturing activity. Moreover,
the predictive power of p§t outperforms standard financial market indicators like the shape of
the Treasury yield curve, the real federal funds rate, and aggregate stock market performance.
The rare disasters paradigm also makes a strong prediction for how time-series variation
in the probability of disaster relates to the cross-sectional performance of stocks. Intuitively,
stocks that rise in value as disasters becomemore likely are valuable hedges against macroeco-
nomic crises. As a result, these stocks earn low risk premiums relative to stocks that fall in value
as disasters become more imminent. Still, the operational assumption behind this intuition is
that one can empirically measure the comovement of stocks with the probability of a disaster.
This is another reason why my estimate of p§t is so useful.
To test the model’s prediction that disaster risky stocks require a premium, I implement a
simple real-time trading strategy. Specifically, I sort stocks into portfolios based on how much
they comove with changes in p§t . As implied by the model, I find that disaster risky stocks —
those that lose value as p§t increases — outperform low disaster risk stocks by nearly 7.6% per
year, even after accounting for exposure to standard risk factors. In other words, disaster risk
appears to be priced in the cross section of U.S. equities, and the premium for bearing disaster
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risk is about 7.6% annually.
In the final part of the paper, I make stronger assumptions about the mean frequency and
severity of disasters, as well as preferences. This allows me to quantitatively compare a cali-
brated version of the model to aggregate stock market movements and the cross section of eq-
uity returns. For example, I ask themodel howmuch the stockmarket shouldmove in response
to changes in p§t . Empirically, I find that when p§t increases, the market declines by an amount
that is quantitatively matched by the calibrated model. This finding is also in line with Barro
(2009), who shows that disaster models with Epstein-Zin-Weil preferences require an elasticity
of substitution greater than one in order for the aggregate stock market to decline as disasters
becomemore likely.
In a similar fashion, the calibratedmodel also yields predictions for howmuch disaster risky
stocksmust fall in a crisis in order to justify their large returns. I then compare this to howmuch
these stocks actually fall during the 2008 U.S. financial crisis. Along this dimension, the data
also matches the model reasonably well. In the model, disaster risky stocks must fall by 57% in
a disaster to warrant their high average returns. During the crisis, these same stocks lose about
51% of their value, thoughmany of these stocks benefited from the unprecedented intervention
of the government into U.S. capital markets.
Literature Review
The first major contribution of this paper is to estimate time-series variation in the risk-neutral
probability of a disaster, and the primary asset class that I use is the options market. As men-
tioned earlier, much of the existing research begins from the assumption that the disaster ar-
rival rate is i.i.d. Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2011) use option prices on the S&P 500 to esti-
mate a structural model under this i.i.d assumption. Their findings show that options markets
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imply that disasters happen much more frequently (yet with less severity) than suggested by
consumption data (Barro (2006) or Barro and Ursua (2008)). However, Seo and Wachter (2015)
note that with persistent and time-varying disasters, parameters from consumption data on
disasters can actually generate realistic option prices.2 Thus, drawing conclusions about rare
disasters from option prices depends heavily on model specification, particularly on the time-
varying nature of disasters.
To circumvent anymisspecification issues, my estimate of time-series variation in the prob-
ability of disaster is non-parametric and uses options on a large cross section of firms; at the
firm level, my jump risk measure applies to very general return processes and is not necessarily
linked to a disaster model. This is useful because it allows me to first characterize the option-
implied tails of many different firms, and then check whether the data is consistent with the
disastermodel. In turn, the fact that this cross section of jump-riskmeasures is driven by a com-
mon and time-varying factor is in strong agreement with, among others, Barro (2006), Gabaix
(2012), and Seo andWachter (2015).
The secondmajor contribution of this paper is to provide evidence in favor of the rare disas-
ters paradigm using the cross section of U.S. equity returns. Much of the literature has focused
on whether disasters can rationalize the returns of the aggregate stock market, though it is im-
portant to askwhether thesemodels can also explain the cross section of stock returns. Gao and
Song (2015) find evidence that jump risk is priced across a wide range of asset classes, though
their focus is on broad market indices instead individual stocks. My finding that disaster risk is
priced in the cross section of U.S. equities is also consistent with Cremers, Halling, and Wein-
2The intuition of their findings is as follows: when disasters are time-varying, movements in the probability of
the disaster lead to movements in price-dividend ratios. This generates volatile price-dividend ratios, even if the
disaster never occurs. Without this mechanism, the volatility of price-dividend ratios in normal times appears too
low relative to the volatility of consumption growth in normal times. In turn, models without time-varying disaster
risk will generate large pricing errors for options with strikes that are near the current spot price (at-the-money).
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baum (2015), however their focus is on high-frequency (i.e. daily) jumps, not macroeconomic
disasters.3 Perhaps the closest companion to this paper is Farhi, Fraiberger, Gabaix, Ranciere,
and Verdelhan (2014), who study how disasters impact foreign exchange markets. These au-
thors use a version of the rare disaster model to link currency option premiums to carry trade
premiums. Importantly, I too map my empirical findings to a standard rare disasters model.
This provides me an additional way to evaluate the rare disaster model because I can compare
the cross-sectional pricing results with the predictions of a calibrated version of the model.
Along this dimension, the rare disaster model also holds up reasonably well to the data.
2 Theoretical Motivation
In this section, I first present a non-parametric measure of jump risk that can be constructed
using observed option prices on any given firm. I then use a standard model of time-varying
disasters to map this jump-risk measure to model quantities. Through this process, it is easy
to see that rare disaster models impose a tight restriction on how jump-risk measures should
comove across firms. This restriction then forms the basis of my empirical work in Section 3.
2.1 A Non-Parametric Measure of Jump Risk
Asmentioned,my estimate of time-series variation in the probability of a disaster is non-parametric.
To develop this idea further, I need to first introduce the concept of the risk-neutral probabil-
ity measure and the physical probability measure. The physical probability measure describes
different states of the world according to their actual likelihood of occurring. The risk-neutral
3Other evidence of tail risk being priced in the cross section of equities can be found in Kelly and Jiang (2014),
who rely on extreme value theory to learn about the tails of asset prices from realized stock returns (not options).
Bollerslev, Todorov, and Xu (2015) also use options to relate jump risk to stock returns. They use S&P 500 options
to parametrize option-implied tails and find that their estimated jump risk premia forecast future stock returns.
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measure instead weights states of nature according tomarginal utility in those states. Naturally,
states in which marginal utility is high (i.e. recession states) have a higher risk-neutral likeli-
hood than a physical likelihood. In fact, risk-neutral probabilities are just Arrow-Debreu state
prices, appropriately normalized so that they correspond to a probabilitymeasure. In any equi-
libriummodel, the mapping between risk-neutral and actual probability measures is therefore
determined entirely by the pricing kernel implied by the model.
Without imposing a specific asset pricingmodel, suppose that equilibrium stock returns for




=µ§i t d t +æ§i t dW §i t + (F§i t °1)d J§i t (1)
where Pi t is the stock price of firm i at time t . Here, I am using the § superscript to make clear
that we are examining returns under the risk-neutral probability measure. According to this
reduced-form specification, risk-neutral returns are subject to two-shocks. The first is a dif-
fusive Brownian motion shock, dW §i t , where the risk-neutral volatility æ
§
i t of the total diffusive
portion of returns is left unspecified.
The second is a “jump” shock, captured by the process d J§i t . d J
§
i t takes a value of 1 if a jump
occurs over the next instant, and 0 if not. The risk-neutral Poisson arrival rate of jumps is time
varying, firm specific, and denoted by p§i t . Hence, a jump happens over a small time interval,
dt , with a risk-neutral probability of p§i t d t . When a jump does occur, the size of the jump is
governed by the stochastic variable F§i t . For instance, if F
§
i t = 0.9, then the stock price will drop
by 10% when a jump occurs. In addition, I assume that F§i t and p
§
i t are independent, and that
the risk-neutral distribution of F§i t is time-invariant. Later, I discuss the importance of these
assumptions when interpreting my empirical findings.
The risk-neutral return process in Equation (1) is intentionally quite general, and therefore
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nests the equilibrium outcome of many different asset pricing models.4 Importantly, different
asset pricing models will lead to different restrictions on the shock processes, dW §i t and d J
§
i t .
I am specifically interested in what rare disaster models imply about the process d J§i t , both
theoretically and empirically.
In this general case though, recent developments in option pricing theory suggest a way to
use observed option prices to learn something about p§i t . In particular, Du and Kapadia (2013)
develop ameasure of jump risk that can be inferred fromoption prices, which I denote byDi t (ø)
for “disaster risk”. Di t (ø) is the value of a simple portfolio of call and put options on firm i and
formed on date t . It consists of options written across many different strike prices, all with
maturity of ø. The exact details of this measure can be found in Appendix C.
To develop some intuition now, consider the popular VIX index. The VIX is the price of a
portfolio of call and put options written on the S&P 500. In the absence of jumps, the value of
the VIX (squared) is the expected risk-neutral variance of the S&P 500 over the next month, or





¢2dsi for i = S&P 500 and ø = 30 days. However, when risk-neutral re-
turns are subject to jumps, the VIX is a biased estimate of≠i t (ø).5 The reason is that jumps cre-
ate additional return volatility, as squared returns can come from continuous diffusive move-
ments or discontinuous jumps. As pointed out byDu andKapadia (2013), it is possible to design
an alternative option portfolio — one whose value is Di t (ø) — that isolates the bias in the VIX
that is induced by jumps. In turn, Di t (ø) captures the “extra” variation that jumps create for
risk-neutral returns. In Appendix C, I also use a stylized example to deepen the intuition of why
Di t is able to isolate jumps.
More specifically, Carr and Wu (2009) and Du and Kapadia (2013) show that when risk-
4The only restriction is the standard no-arbitrage requirement that the discounted risk-neutral stock price is a
martingale. This implies that µi t = r f t °p§i tEt [Fi t °1], where r f t is the instantaneous riskless rate.
5This point has been made by, amongmany others, Martin (2013) and Carr andWu (2009).
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neutral returns evolve according to Equation (1), Di t (ø) captures the following notion of firm
i ’s jump risk from time t to t +ø:
Di t (ø)= ™i £p§i t (ø)






to denote the risk-neutral expected
likelihood of a jump from t to t +ø. ™i is a firm-specific constant that depends on the distribu-
tion of Fi t . The exact expression for™i is given in Equation (47) of Appendix C.6.6
In my empirical work, I will use observed option prices to form a Di t (ø) measure for a very
large panel of firms. It should be clear by now that this measure is non-parametric in the sense
that its construction and interpretation are not anchored to any specific asset pricing model.
My next task is to map Di t (ø) to a standard model of time-varying disasters. This will generate
a key testable prediction for how Di t (ø) measures should comove across firms.
2.2 Mapping to a Rare Disasters Model
I now solve a continuous time generalization of the endowment economy in Gabaix (2012). In
the main text, I present only the basic ingredients of the model and the important equilibrium
outcomes. The full details of themodel can be found in Appendix A. The purpose of this exercise
is to develop intuition for how the Di t (ø) measures from the previous section should behave
under the null of the model.
6To be clear, Di t captures any expected discontinuities in the risk-neutral return process, though it is not pos-
sible to infer the size of the discontinuity (jump) from Di t alone. An alternative notion of disaster risk could be to
look at risk-neutral probabilities implied by deep out-of-the-money put options. The advantage of this approach
is that one could say something about the size of the expected disaster, yet the disadvantage is that it requires
one to observe deep enough out-of-the-money puts. In rare disaster models, the extreme negative tail risk of the
economy is almost always modeled as a pure jump, in which case the twomeasures should coincide.
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2.2.1 Model Primitives
Aggregate Consumption To start, the aggregate endowment evolves as follows:
dCt
Ct°
= gCdt +æCdWCt + (Bt °1)d Jt
whereWCt is a standard Brownian motion and Jt is a jump process that represents macroeco-
nomic disasters. d Jt takes a value of one if a disaster occurs and zero otherwise. The Poisson
arrival rate of disasters is time varying and denoted by pt . Hence, a disaster happens over a
small time interval, dt , with a probability ptdt . The variable Bt > 0 captures the magnitude of
a consumption disaster when it occurs. For example, a value of Bt = 0.8 means that when a dis-
aster occurs, aggregate consumption drops by 20%. I further assume that the intensity process
describing disaster arrivals, pt , is independent of the magnitude of a disaster, Bt . The Brown-
ian motionWCt is independent of Jt and Bt , which means that in the absence of disasters (i.e.
normal times) consumption growth is i.i.d log-normal with a volatility of æC .
Preferences I assume the representative agent has recursive preferences as in Epstein and
Zin (1989) and Duffie and Epstein (1992). The main advantage of recursive preferences is the
ability to decouple the agent’s elasticity of intertemporal substitution, √, from risk aversion, ∞.
In a discrete time setting, Epstein and Zin (1989) show that the representative agent’s stochastic











where ¬ = (1°1/√)/(1°∞) and RC ,t+ø is the gross return of a claim to aggregate consumption
between t and t+ø. Here, Ω captures the rate of time preference of the agent. When solving the
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model, I obtain the stochastic discount factor by taking the continuous time limit of the discrete
time stochastic discount factor, i.e. as ø& 0.
Setup for Individual Stocks A generic stock i is defined as a claim to a stream of dividends
(Dit )t∏0, where dividends grow according to:
dDit
Di t°
= giDdt +dNDi t + (Fi t °1)d Jt
The dividend growth shock NDi t is a martingale so that Et
£
dNDi t
§ = 0 and is independent of the
disaster event. The higher moments of NDi t are left unspecified for now. In equilibrium, only
the first moment of dNDi t will be important for determining the level of asset prices. In normal
times, dividends grow at an expected rate of giD , but if there is a disaster, the stock dividend
experiences an additional shock, Fi t . Fi t > 0 captures how much dividends recover during a
disaster. For instance, if Fi t = 0.9, then dividends drop by 10% when a disaster arrives. Firms
with high values of Fi t therefore perform better during a crisis. The important thing to note
at this juncture is that, inside of the model, firm dividend growth and aggregate consumption
growth are both exposed to the same aggregate “jump” process, Jt . This is the sense in which
disasters are macroeconomic— they impact all firms in the economy at the same time.
In order to compute equilibrium stock prices, wemust putmore structure on the arrival rate
of disasters (pt ), the recovery rate of disasters at themacroeconomic level (Bt ), and the dividend
recovery rate during a disaster (Fi t ). One way to accomplish this is to model the dynamics of
pt , Bt , and Fi t separately. Wachter (2013) is one example of this approach, as she models pt as
a Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) process. Alternatively, Gabaix (2012) models the dynamics of
pt , Bt , and Fi t jointly, which I adopt in continuous time here. I do so through a variable called
resilience,Hit , which summarizes how a firm is expected to perform if a disaster occurs over the
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next instant, dt . I define stock i ’s resilience exactly as in Equation (31) in Appendix C; however,
in Appendix C I also show that a very good approximation that ismore useful for understanding









It is easy to see that firms that are expected to perform well in a disaster (i.e. firms whose div-
idends recover a lot) have high values of Fi t , and thus are high resilience stocks. For ease of
notation, I drop the limit notation of Et° and replace it by Et , except when it is necessary to
distinguish the two.
Resilience itself ismodeled as a linearity generating (LG) process as inGabaix (2009). Linear-
ity generating processes behave, in an approximate sense, like an AR(1) process. The distinction
between an LG process and an AR(1) process is subtle; however, LG processes are useful in eco-
nomics because they deliver linear expressions for equilibrium price-dividend ratios without
needing log-linearizations.7 As is common inmacroeconomics, I further decompose resilience
into a long-run mean, Hi§, and deviations from that mean, Hˆi t :
Hit =Hi§+ Hˆi t
In turn, firm i ’s resilience (deviations frommean) evolves according to the following stochastic
7Wachter (2013) and Seo andWachter (2015) are examples of rare disasters models that uses log-linearizations.
Indeed, in order to ensure model tractability, these authors adopt an IES of 1.
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differential equation:
dHˆi t = °¡H ,i Hˆi td t ° Hˆ2i t d t +dNHi t
º °¡H ,i Hˆi td t +dNHi t
where NHit is a martingale. It is easy to now see the relationship between an AR(1) process and
an LG process. The term °¡H ,i Hˆi td t would be present in the continuous time analogue of an
AR(1) process, and so ¡H ,i determines the speed of mean reversion for the resiliency process.
It is sensible that resilience should behave similarly to an AR(1) process — if a firm has high
resilience today, it is likely that resilience tomorrow is also high. The “extra” term, °Hˆ2i t d t , is
unique to the LG class, and in practice is quite small because Hˆi t captures deviations from the
mean of resilience.8 With the primitives of the model specified, I now turn to analyzing the
equilibrium of this economy.
2.2.2 Equilibrium
In Appendices A and C, I derive the following equilibrium quantities: (i) the riskfree rate r f t ; (ii)
the wealth-consumption ratio; (iv) the price-dividend ratio of a claim to an arbitrary stock; (v)
equilibrium returns under the physical measure, and (vi) equilibrium returns under the risk-
neutral measure. For much of my empirical work, I will focus on the equilibrium returns of
an arbitrary stock i under the risk-neutral measure. In the model, risk-neutral returns take a
8As noted in Gabaix (2009), there are restrictions on the variance of the noise process dNHi t that ensure prices
remain positive. In Appendix C.3, I provide one example of a process that satisfies the restrictions and is also





= r f td t +æi t dW §i t °ptEt
£
B°∞t (Fi t °1)
§
dt + (Fi t °1)d J§t
whereW §i t is a Brownian motion under the risk-neutral measure and æi t is defined in Equation
(35). d J§t is the disaster process under the risk-neutral measure and it arrives at a risk-neutral




. It is useful at this point to compare p§t to pt . When disasters are bad
for the economy (Et [Bt ]< 1), then the risk-neutral likelihood of a crisis is higher than the actual
likelihood, i.e. p§t > pt . This occurs because the risk-averse agent prices assets as if disasters
are more likely than they actually are in nature.
Armed with risk-neutral equilibrium returns, it is also straightforward to work out that the
jump-risk measure Di t (ø) from Section 2.1 maps to the following quantity inside of the model:
Di t (ø)=™i £p§t (ø) (2)






is the risk-neutral expected probability of a disaster from
time t to t + ø. Again, the exact expression for ™i is given in Equation (47) of Appendix C.6
and it depends on the higher moments of Fi t . In deriving the mapping between the model and
Di t (ø), the working assumption that I have made is that the distribution of disasters Fi t is time-
invariant and independent of the size of the aggregate recovery rate, Bt . These assumptions
are made for the sake of parsimony, and I discuss how they impact the interpretation of my re-
sults in Section 3.2. Often times, I will drop the argument ø and simply write p§t ; in this case,
the reader can assume that ø = 30 days, which corresponds to the horizon that I study in my
empirical analysis.
The important takeaway at this juncture is that at each time t , rare disasters models imply
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that all cross-sectional variation in Di t (ø) is driven by variation in ™i . This holds true only
because p§t (ø) is common to all firms in the economy. Indeed, we saw in Section 2.1 that when
each firm has its idiosyncratic probability of a jump p§i t (ø), cross-sectional variation in Di t (ø)
was instead driven by variation in both™i and p§i t (ø). In other words, the rare disasters model
restricts the risk-neutral probability of a jump to be the same across all firms, p§i t (ø)= p§t (ø).
Econometrically, thismeans that under the rare disasters hypothesis, a panel ofDi t (ø) should
obey a latent factor structure that is linear in a single factor. To see thismore forcefully, suppose
thatmy estimate ofDi t (ø) is denoted by bDi t (ø). Further suppose that the trueDi t (ø) ismeasured
with some idiosyncratic measurement error, ei t , such that:
bDi t (ø) = Di t (ø)+ei t
= ™i £p§t (ø)+ei t (3)
The idiosyncratic measurement error can be interpreted as pure noise in the option prices
or as unmodeled idiosyncratic jump risk.9 Because we do not observe™i or p§t (ø), Equation (3)
is a latent factormodel. As is well-known in latent factor analysis, the loadings (™i ) and the fac-
tor (p§t (ø)) are not separably identifiable. Thus, we can estimate time-series variation in p§t (ø).
Nonetheless, this procedure cannot pin down the mean of p§t (ø), though it would certainly be
useful to do so given that the academic debate about these models has centered around how
often (and severe) disasters actually happen. Still, the critical assumption underlying the entire
class of rare disastermodels is that p§t (ø) is common to all firms, and this easily testable hypoth-
esis forms the basis for the empirical work in this paper.10 Finally, to avoid notional confusion,
9For instance, consider a case where each firm is exposed to a systematic jump risk factor and an idiosyncratic
jump risk factor. In this case, it is possible to show that Di t (ø) will be linear in both jump-risk factors. In turn, the
idiosyncratic jump risk factor will just be absorbed into the noise term ei t .
10For the entire class of rare disaster models, the pricing kernel is subject to large and rare jumps, corresponding
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I will henceforth not distinguish between Di t (ø) and bDi t (ø); however, implicit in my remaining
analysis is the latent factor structure andmeasurement errors that are defined in Equation (3).
3 An Estimate of the Risk-Neutral Probability of Disaster
In this section, I build measures of Di t (ø) using a large cross section of option prices, thereby
allowing me to test the model’s central prediction that Di t (ø) should be governed by a single
factor. This procedure also provides me a way to extract an estimate of the risk-neutral proba-
bility of a disaster, p§t . Finally, in the latter part of the section I explore the predictions of general
equilibriummodels of disasters by relating p§t to future economic activity.
3.1 Construction and Data Description
As alluded to earlier, each jump risk measure Di t (ø) is really just a portfolio of call and put
options written on firm i , as of date t . Thus, to construct each Di t (ø) measure, I proceed in
two steps: (i) collect option prices (across strike prices) of maturity ø on date t ; (ii) combine call
and puts of different strikes according to the portfolio weights in Du and Kapadia (2013). Di t (ø)
is simply the resulting price of the portfolio. The exact weights take a fairly complex form, and
explicit formulas can be found in Appendix B.1.
The data used to construct the panel ofDi t (ø) comes fromOptionMetrics. For each firm and
each date, I collect only out-of-the-money (OTM) options that meet the following criteria: (i)
open interest is strictly positive, (ii) best offer minus best bid is strictly positive, (iii) best bid is
strictly positive, (iv) no special settlement; (iv) the maturity of the option is greater than 7 days;
to large increases in marginal utility. If this is the case, then risk-neutral returns for all firms in the economy will
be exposed to a common jump process. Thus, the arguments in this section are not necessarily tied to this specific
disaster risk model.
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and (vi) implied volatility is not missing. This screening procedure requires me to merge raw
option prices with underlying security information, which I obtain fromOptionMetrics as well.
The construction of my final measure proceeds in a two steps. I first compute a Di t (ø)
according to Equation (20) for each available option maturity on date t . Next, I compute a
Di t (ø= 30 days) by linearly interpolating between theDi t (ø) formaturities that straddle 30 days.
For the remainder of the paper and with some abuse of notation, I use Di t to denote the 30-day
implied measure. A complete description of this procedure can be found in Appendix B.
The end result is a panel of Di t (ø = 30 days) for 6,762,860 firm-day pairs. For each firm, I
also construct a monthly measure by averaging within each month. For example, if the current
month is January 1997, then the monthly measure of Di t effectively represents the risk-neutral
expected jump risk of firm i during February 1997. When aggregating to a monthly measure, I
require that each firm has at least 70% of its daily observations available for that month.
3.2 Results
I beginmy empirical analysis by conducting principal component analysis on the panel ofDi t . I
analyze the monthly Di t because it allows me to study a larger cross section of firms, and it also
smooths daily measurement noise. To be included in the analysis, a firm must have its entire
time-series available for the period January 1996 to May 2015, leaving 242 firms in total.11
Figure 1 indicates that there is a strong one-factor structure driving time-series variation in
Di t across firms. The first principal component is dominant, explaining nearly 50% of the vari-
ation across Di t . The remaining principal components are much weaker. The second principal
11Specifically, a firmmust have at least 70% of its daily observation in a month to be included. Principal compo-
nent analysis is conducted on the correlation matrix of monthly Di t . This analysis applies to the set of firms with
at least 80% of its monthly observations. To generate the time-series of the factor, I fill missing data in with mean
values. The results are not sensitive to these choices.
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component captures a little over 10% of variation and the third component accounts for less
than 5%. The factor structure inherent in Di t is consistent with the model’s core assumption of
a single disaster event driving asset prices for all firms in the economy. I therefore interpret the
first extracted principal component as p§t . Appendix B.6 contains a more detailed mapping of
the extracted factor to model quantities.
Figure 2 displays the time-series of the risk-neutral probability of disaster. It is clear that
p§t is very persistent (monthly AR(1) coefficient of 0.91), which is what we would expect if it
reflects the likelihood of macroeconomic crises. It also seems reasonable to view p§t as the
probability of disaster based on its evolution through time, as its peaks correspond to some
well-known crisis episodes. For instance, p§t spikes after the terrorist attack on theUnited States
in September 2001. Similarly, it rises in July 2002 in response toWorldComfiling for bankruptcy
(at the time this was the largest corporate insolvency ever), increased turmoil in the Gaza Strip,
and an earthquake in Germany.
The focal point of rare disasters models is large drops in aggregate consumption, and wars
are often cited as an example of these deep recessions. Consistent with this notion, a prolonged
period of high disaster probability occurs at the onset of the U.S.-Iraq War. Moreover, the tech-
nology bubble that burst at the end of the 1990s does not seem to have the same effect on
disaster likelihood as the war, indicating that recessions don’t drive all movements in this time
series.
The period from 2002 to 2007 corresponds to a relatively low value for p§t , with disaster risk
rising at the beginning of the U.S. financial crisis in August 2007. The massive increase in p§t in
October 2008 followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and a series of
global stock market crashes at the end of October 2008. Themaximum for the sample occurred
in November 2008, the same month that the U.S. government injected $40 billion into AIG, a
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proposal to bailout U.S. automakers failed in the U.S. Senate, and the government injected $20
billion into Citigroup. Overall, the six largest months for p§t occur during the pinnacle of the
U.S. financial crisis from October 2008 to March 2009.
There is another spike inMay 2010 following the so-called “flash crash” and the spread of the
European debt crisis as Spain, Portugal, and Greece all saw their economic conditions worsen
significantly. The last major rise in disaster probability occurs in August 2011, when there were
concerns about the European sovereign debt crisis worsening, aswell asworries over a potential
downgrade of the creditworthiness of U.S. debt.
In Table 1, I compute the correlation of p§t with other popular financial market indicators,
both in levels and first differences. Unsurprisingly, periods of high p§t coincide with low prices,
as evidenced by the -23% correlation in levels (-50% in first differences) with the price-dividend
ratio of the S&P 500. In addition, p§t appears to be modestly correlated with the TED spread
(50% in levels, 35% in first differences), indicating that a rise in the risk-neutral probability of
a disaster occurs when financial market liquidity dries up.12 Finally, changes in p§t display a
modest negative correlation with innovations to financial intermediary leverage (Adrian et al.
(2014)), suggesting that financial firms deleverage as disaster risk increases. In sum, the evo-
lution of p§t and its correlation with other financial market variables are consistent with the
interpretation that p§t measures variation in the risk-neutral probability of a disaster.
Alternative Interpretation I have interpreted the common factor drivingmovements inDi t as
measuring changes in the risk-neutral probability of a disaster, p§t . An equally plausible inter-
pretation is that I’m picking up commonmovements in the severity of disasters, and I certainly
12Unsurprisingly, p§t is highly correlated with disaster risk DSPX of the S&P 500 index (88% in levels, 69% in first
differences). However, a closer inspection of the two series reveals the advantage of estimating p§t using principal
component analysis instead of directly using DSPX ; the mean-to-variance ratio of p§t is about 0.79 whereas the
same ratio forDSPX is 0.53. Insofar as this metric captures the signal-to-noise ratio of a series, then p§t is measured
with 50%more precision than DSPX .
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can’t rule this out, nor do I really need to. To see why, consider the most general case where
aggregate disaster probability (pt ) and recovery (Bt ) are time-varying, and so is the distribution
of firm-level disaster recovery (Fi t ). Without any loss of generality, we can assume that™i t —a
function of the distribution of Fi t — can be decomposed into a common component, ™t , and
an idiosyncratic component, ªi t . In this case it is easy to show that the jump-risk measure Di t
corresponds to:
Di t = p§t ™t +p§t ªi t
which implies that there should be one very strong factor driving Di t , and potentially a weaker
second factor, depending on the variability of ªi t . Because the data broadly supports this gen-
eral case, my focus is on the first extracted factor. The larger point here is that the factor struc-
ture of theDi t tells us something about common time-series variation in the probability and/or
severity of a jump across all firms. Rare disaster models make strong predictions for what this
common variation should look like, and this is really what I’m taking advantage of in this paper.
As we will also see, the distinction between a common time-varying probability versus severity
of a disaster is not particularly important for my remaining empirical findings.
3.3 p§t and Future Economic Activity
If movements in p§t are in fact capturing macroeconomic disaster risk, then it is natural to ex-
pect p§t to relate to broader macroeconomic activity. Indeed, Gourio (2012) builds a general
equilibrium model where disasters impact both total factor productivity (TFP) and the aggre-
gate capital stock. A key insight of this model is that an increase in disaster likelihood — not
necessarily a realization of a disaster — can itself have a profound impact on the macroecon-
omy. For instance, when the likelihood of a disaster increases, firms reduce investment because
21
physical capital becomes riskier. In addition, an imminent disaster reduces the return on sav-
ings, meaning unemployment increases becausework today is less attractive. Kilic andWachter
(2015) also build amodel where disaster risk increases unemployment by lowering job-creation
incentives. Like in Gourio (2012), future unemployment responds to disaster risk itself without
needing an actual shock to labor productivity.
To empirically test whether an increase in the probability of a disaster leads to contractions






where Yt+1 is a measure of economic activity and Xt is a vector of competing forecasting vari-
ables. The macroeconomic activity measures that I use are as follows: the (i) change in the un-
employment rate; (ii) percentage change in the Industrial Production Index; (iii) change in total
industry capacity utilization; and (iv) percentage change in the ISM Manufacturing Invento-
ries Index.13 Following Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012), I use standard financial market variables
as my competing forecasting variables. Specifically, Xt includes the real federal funds rate, the
term spread fromU.S. treasury yields (10-yearminus 3-month constantmaturity yield), and the
excess return of the CRSP-value weighted index.14
The forecasting regression results in column (1) of Panels A-D in Table 2 indicate that p§t is
statistically a highly significant predictor of future economic conditions. Also consistent with
theory, an increase in p§t forecasts an economicallymeaningful decline in activity. For instance,
a one standard deviation increase in p§t translates to an increase in unemployment of 0.065
13The unemployment rate comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (series id = LNS14000000). The industrial
production index (series id = INDPRO), total capacity utilization (series id = TCU), ISMManufacturing: Inventories
Index (series id = NAPMII) were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database.
14The real federal funds rate is computed as the average monthly effective federal funds rate within month t ,
minus the growth rate of the PCE price index betweenmonths t °1 and t °13.
22
percentage points (e.g. an increase from 5.8% unemployment to 5.865%). The U.S. labor force
is roughly 160million people, so this translates to about 100,000 lost jobs permonth. Moreover,
panels B-D in Table 2 suggest that investment does indeed fall as disasters becomemore likely.
A rise in p§t leads to fairly large drops in total capacity utilization, industrial production, and the
manufacturing inventories index.
The results in column (1) of Panels A-D in Table 2 also indicate that, in the short-run, the
macroeconomy almost always respondsmoremovements in p§t relative to other popular finan-
cial market indicators. For instance, a one standard deviation increase in p§t lowers industrial
production by 0.16% per month. This may not appear to be a particularly large response, yet
industrial production responds even less to the term spread, the real federal funds rate, and the
return on the aggregate stock market. Overall then, the forecasting exercise demonstrates that
p§t contains important information about future economic downturns — information that is
also not contained in standard financial market indicators.
Additional Robustness It is natural to wonder whether these forecasting results are driven a
single data point, namely the 2008 financial crisis. To explore this idea further, I rerun the fore-
casting regressions, but exclude the NBER recession years from the crisis (December 2007 to
June 2009). Column (3) of Panels A-D in Table 2 indicates that the forecasting results generally
go through when excluding the crisis. The results are somewhat weaker though, as evidenced
by the lower forecasting R2. Nonetheless, when forecasting on future unemployment, indus-
trial production, and total capacity utilization, the magnitude and significance of the point es-
timates on p§t are also fairly robust to excluding the crisis.
To further highlight the unique informational content of p§t , in Column (2) of Panels A-D
in Table 2, I also include the VIX index in the forecasting regressions. Column (4) repeats the
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forecasting regressions with the VIX, but excludes the crisis period. The VIX is a natural bench-
mark in this setting because it also derives from option prices. Indeed, p§t is 85% correlated
with the VIX in levels and 63% in first differences. However, this is not really that surprising; as
shown by Du and Kapadia (2013) andMartin (2013), the VIX is a biased estimate of risk-neutral
volatility, and the bias comes precisely from the jump component of risk-neutral returns.15 Put
differently, the VIX contains information on both disasters and normal-times volatility, whereas
p§t measures only time-varying disaster risk.
In a majority of cases, the inclusion of the VIX does not drive out the forecasting ability of
p§t . In all specifications, both with and without the crisis, the point estimate on p§t is basically
unchanged when including the VIX. Moreover, in five out of eight cases, p§t remains statistically
significant at a 10% confidence level. The latter finding is somewhat surprising, given that one
would expect the standard errors in the regression to rise because the VIX and p§t are highly
correlated. Moreover, the VIX has economically small point estimates in nearly all specifica-
tions. In total, it therefore seems reasonable — and consistent with rare disaster models — to
conclude that p§t is a unique and robust forecaster of future economic activity.
4 Disaster Risk and The Cross Section of Equity Returns
Thus far, much of the empirical analysis has centered around the model’s predictions for the
factor structure in option-implied jumpmeasures and the estimation of p§t , a singlemeasure of
aggregate disaster risk. Still, the model makes strong predictions for the cross section of equity
returns as well. The easiest way to see this is from Theorem 2 in Appendix A, which states that
the expected excess returnµi t°r f t for an arbitrary stock i is decreasing in the expected amount
15In fact, theDi t measure constructed earlier takes advantage of this bias to isolate jump risk from option prices.
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that it recovers during a crisis, Fi :
µi t ° r f t = ptEt
£
B°∞t (1°Fi t )
§
This result makes intuitive sense because if a firm is expected to recover a lot during a crisis
(high Fi t ), it should command a low risk premium. To this end, if given an estimate of Et [Fi t ]
at each point in time, one could sort stocks based on Et [Fi t ].16 In turn, the model predicts that
stocks with high values of Et [Fi t ] should earn low average returns, and vice versa. The following
proposition provides a simple way to operationalize this using basic OLS regressions and my
estimated p§t .
Proposition 1. Within the model, consider an OLS regression of realized returns for firm i , r it , on
changes in the risk-neutral probability of disaster:
r it = a+Øi¢p§t +eit
Assume Bt and Fi t are independent and that expectations of these variables are constant over
small increments. Then Øi is increasing in Et [Fi t ], i.e. @Øi/@Et [Fi t ] > 0. This is true even if the
true mean of p§t is unknown. Thus, firms with higher Øi should earn lower average returns.
Proof. See Appendix C.7.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is straightforward: stocks that move in tandemwith p§t (posi-
tiveØi firms) are valuable hedges against disasters. These stocks do not commandhigh risk pre-
miums. Furthermore, even when the mean of p§t is not known— the case for the p§t estimated
in the previous section — the relative rankings based on Øi do not change. This is because the
16Clearly, this assumes that Bt and Fi t are independent.
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dispersion in Øi at each point in time is unaffected by the mean of p§t .17 Henceforth, I call Øi a
firm’s “disaster-Ø” in order to distinguish it from the standard CAPM Ø.
It is also important to recognize that disaster-Ø’s are a good way to detect priced disaster
risk in more general settings. For instance, one could easily add idiosyncratic jumps to the
firm dividend process in the model. It is straightforward to workout that the model-implied
Di will be additive in the aggregate risk-neutral jump process, p§t , and the idiosyncratic jump
process for each firm. In this case, Di will continue to obey a single-factor structure, with the
single factor still representing p§t .18 Thus, disaster-Ø’s will still pick up on the priced disaster
component of each firm’s equity.
4.0.1 Empirical Implementation
In lieu of Proposition 1, I apply the following procedure. For each firm, I compute a weekly Di
by taking within-week averages of that firm’s daily Di . At the end of eachmonthm, I extract the
first principal component of the previous year’s estimates of weekly Di . I call this my estimate
of p§t for month m. Next, I regress firm i ’s weekly equity returns on ¢p§t using data over the
previous year. This delivers an estimate of firm i ’s disaster-Ø. Finally, at the end of monthm, I
sort equities into quintiles based on their estimated Øi . I hold these equal-weighted portfolios
for one month, then repeat the entire procedure. The sample of stocks that I examine comes
from CRSP. I consider only common stocks (CRSP SHRCD 10 or 11) that are listed on the NYSE,
NYSE Amex, or NASDAQ. To avoid penny stocks, I also exclude stocks with a share price of less
than $1 at the time of portfolio formation.
There are two aspects of this approach that are worth noting. First, the trading strategy is
fully implementable in real-time: p§t and the Øi ’s are all estimated using only data that was
17i.e. Scaling p§t by a positive constant c simply scales all Øi by c. It does not change relative rankings.
18i.e. the idiosyncratic jump will be absorbed into the noise term in the Equation (3).
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available at the end of month m. To further ensure tradability, I measure disaster-Ø’s on the
last business day of each month, but I form the portfolios at the end of the next business day.19
Second, I am able to discern which stocks are disaster risky, even if these stocks do not have
traded options. This is very useful because it allows me to examine the pricing implications of
the disaster model for a much broader set of equities.
To give an example of my empirical strategy, suppose I am standing at the end of January
1997. I first construct a weekly p§t series using option data from January 1996-January 1997.
Next, for each firm in my CRSP sample, I regress weekly returns from January 1996 to January
1997 on ¢p§t to get Øi . I then put firms with the largest Øi ’s into one portfolio, and so forth. I
form the portfolios on the first day in February 1997, hold them until the end of themonth, and
then repeat the procedure.





t )£æ(r it )
æ(¢p§t )
whereæ(x) is the estimated volatility of series x, and Ω(y,x) is the estimated correlation between
x and y . A more detailed description of how I create these equity portfolios can also be found
in Appendix B.
4.1 Results
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the portfolios formed based on disaster risk. As ex-
pected, the raw average excess return is monotonically increasing in disaster risk. High disaster
risk stocks (portfolio 5) earn 12.26% in annualized excess returns whereas low disaster risk firms
19This means the market values used for value-weighting are as of the beginning of the following month. Simi-
larly, realized returns are computed from the first of the month to the end of the month.
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earn only 5.08%. Row 4 of Table 3 also suggests that disaster risky stocks tend to be smaller, with
an average market capitalization of about $1.47 billion.
The defining feature of disaster risky stocks is their sensitivity to movements in p§t . As is
evident from the fifth row of Table 3, disaster risky stocks display a negative contemporaneous
relationship with changes in p§t , whereas low disaster risk stocks have positive comovement
with p§t . The dispersion in estimate disaster-Ø’s across quintiles is also quite strong, ranging
from 14 to -12. Later in Section 4.2, I use a calibrated version of the model to interpret these
estimated Ø’s further.
Table 4 displays the risk-adjusted returns for each portfolio, which are computed using ex-
posure to the three Fama-French factors and a standard momentum portfolio.20 Four-factor
alphas increasemonotonically whenmoving from low disaster risk to high disaster risk. A port-
folio that is long disaster risky stocks and short low disaster risk stocks earns 7.56% in annual-
ized alpha (t-statistic of 2.35). Though the point estimate on the alpha for low disaster-Ø stocks
is measured imprecisely, the negative sign indicates that investors are actually willing to pay a
premium for firms that hedge their exposure to macroeconomic disasters.
Interestingly, the CAPM-Ø is relatively flat when moving from low to high disaster risk (row
3 of Table 4), suggesting that disaster-Ø contains information that is not captured by simple ex-
posure to the aggregate stock market. This finding is consistent with Gabaix (2012)’s argument
that CAPM-Ø may poorly measure disaster exposure due to a lack of realizations in the data.
This observation also highlights the usefulness of deriving disaster-Ø based on exposure to an
option-basedmeasure, p§t : one does not necessarily require a disaster to be realized in order to
measure disaster risk.
Rows 5 through 10 summarize the exposure of the disaster-sorted portfolios to the Fama-
20All risk factors were obtained from Ken French’s website.
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French size and value factors, as well as the standard momentum factor. Because there is not a
great deal of dispersion in the loadings on the Fama-French size factor, the long-short portfolio
(5-1) has only a slightly negative exposure to size. In a similar vein, the exposure of the 5-1
portfolio to momentum is nearly zero. On the other hand, it appears that disaster risky stocks
have some relation to value. The loadings on the value factor generally increase when moving
from low to high disaster risk. Nonetheless, the magnitudes of the loadings are not particularly
high, as the 5-1 portfolio has a value-Ø of only about 0.5. Thus, exposure to standard risk factors
does not seem to explain the dispersion of excess returns generated by differential disaster risk.
The last row of Table 4 presents the test that the alphas of portfolios 1-5 are jointly zero. As
indicated by a p-value of 1.3%, the null hypothesis of this test is strongly rejected. In summary,
these results suggest that disaster risk is priced in the cross section of U.S. equities. Consistent
with the model, disaster risky stocks require high excess returns and the premium for bearing
disaster risk appears to be around 7.6% per year.
Robustness
Tables 5 - 7 present various robustness tests of the claim that disaster risk is priced in the cross
section of equities. Table 5 constructs value-weighted, as opposed to equal-weighted, portfolios
based on disaster-Ø. The patterns are generally the same as the equal-weighted portfolios, with
the long-short portfolio earning an even higher alpha of 11.8% (t-statistic of 3.11). Like with
the equal-weighted case, the 5-1 portfolio does not have large loadings on the market, size, or
momentum portfolios. There still appears to be a relation between disaster risk and value in-
vesting. However, this relationship is not enough to explain the dispersion in alphas generated
by differential loading on disaster risk. The joint test that all portfolio alphas are equal to zero
is also strongly rejected.
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In Tables 6 and 7 display the results of the portfolio sorts (both equal and value-weighted)
when disaster-Ø is computed using daily data, as opposed to weekly data.21 The results are only
slightly weaker, but there is a natural explanation for this. The estimate for p§t is much noisier at
a daily level and stocks with thin trading have no daily price changes. The combination of these
two issues addsmeasurement error to the estimation of disaster-Ø’s, thereby creatingmuch less
dispersion because disaster-Ø’s shrink towards zero. Nonetheless, from the first row of Tables 6
and 7, it is still the case that high disaster risk stocks earn higher risk-adjusted returns than low
disaster risk stocks. Moreover, when forming portfolios on a value-weighted basis, the 5-1 earns
a four-factor alpha of about 10% and this alpha is significantly different from zero in a statistical
sense. The joint test that all of the alphas are zero is also rejected at a 1% confidence level when
value-weighting.
4.2 Two Calibration Exercises
4.2.1 How Big Should Disaster-Ø’s Be?
For a calibrated version of the model, how sensitive should returns be to changes in p§t ? To
simplify the calibration, I assume that Bt and Fi t are constants. Further, I assume that pt is
constant within each month. Together, these two assumptions deliver a simple expression for
the model-implied disaster-Øi .
Corollary 1. Suppose Bt and Fi t are constant, and pt is constant within each month. Consider
the regression:
ri t = ai +Øi¢p§t +ei t
21To compute a daily disaster-Ø I estimate: ri t = ai +P2k=0Øik¢p§t°k + ei t , at a daily frequency. As is common in
the literature, the lags account for asynchronous trading. The disaster-Ø for firm i is then
P2
k=0Øik . The regression
uses the previous quarter’s worth of data.
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where™ corresponds to the average™i = 2£
©
1+ ln(Fi )+ [ln(Fi )]2 /2°Fi
™
in the economy.
Proof. See Appendix C.8
Based on Corollary 1, I conduct a calibration exercise. Most of the parameters are close to
Barro (2006) and Gabaix (2012). For instance, I set B = 0.60, corresponding to a 40% drop in
consumption during a disaster. Similarly, I compute ™ by using the average F across firms. I
set F = B = 0.6, indicating that the aggregate stock market falls 40% in a crisis. This number
is roughly consistent with the recent experience during the 2008 U.S. financial crisis.22 I use
a modest risk-aversion of ∞ = 4, which in the previously mentioned studies is large enough
to match the unconditional average equity risk premium. Finally, I assume the intertemporal
elasticity of consumption (IES) is equal to 2, which produces ¬=°1/6).
Figure 3 generates a range ofØi for different values of firm recovery, Fi . All of the parameters
used in the calibration are listed along the top of the figure. As detailed in Proposition 1, Øi is
monotonically increasing in Fi . Loosely speaking, this is why sorting on Øi is equivalent to
sorting on Fi . Additionally, for reasonable values of Fi 2 [0.5,0.8], Øi ranges from about -25 to
15. The range of these model-implied disaster-Ø’s roughly matches their data counterparts, as
reported in row 5 of Table 3.
To hone the calibration further, in Table 8 I empirically estimate the disaster-Ø of the S&P
500 and find ØSP º °6.4. Under the current calibration exercise, the model implies that ØSP =
22Alternatively, one could easily incorporate uncertainty about the severity of disaster. For instance, Barro and
Jin (2011) estimate a power law distribution to the size of disasters. When the size of disasters is fat tailed, then
the average disaster size can be much smaller than 40% and still generate large risk premia. As this calibration is
largely illustrative, I use the simpler assumption of a constant disaster severity.
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°11.23 By nomeans is this comparison a formal test, but themodel does line up reasonably well
with the data along this particular dimension. More broadly, the empirical fact that the market
falls in value as p§t rises implies an IES greater than one. This point is also argued by, among
others, Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and Ursua (2013).
Assuming a constant firm recovery rate Fi t was useful in the current calibration exercise to
get a sense of average disaster-Ø’s. Still, how likely is it that Fi t is constant? The results in Table 8
also shed some light on this question. From Table 8, variation in p§t can explain only about 25%
of the variation in aggregate stock returns. Gabaix (2012) finds a similar, albeit slightly smaller
value of 13%.24 In the context of themodel, the fact that time-series variation in p§t accounts for
a relatively small amount of return variation implies that the remaining movements are driven
by Fi t . It appears then that Fi t must vary through time, which is a one reason I estimate disaster-
Ø’s using rolling regressions when performing portfolio sorts.
4.2.2 Do Disaster Risky Stocks Fall Enough to Justify Their High Returns?
The results in this section suggest that disaster risk is a priced risk for the cross section of equity
returns. High disaster risk stocks earn high returns precisely because they are the most liable
to lose value during macroeconomic crises. To assess this statement within the model, I ask
a simple question: how much does the model imply disaster risky stocks must lose in order
to justify their returns? Then, I compare the model-implied loss rates to what we actually see
during the 2008 U.S. financial crisis, arguably classified as a macroeconomic disaster.
As a loose evaluation, I focus on the unconditional average (risk-adjusted) excess returns of
the disaster risk portfolios from earlier in the section. I infer amodel-implied Fi for each portfo-
23Implicitly this means I set FSP = F = 0.6.
24The 13% comes via a regression of changes in the aggregate price-dividend ratio on changes in the real riskless
rate. The idea in that setting is that movements in the riskless rate reflect only pt .
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lio based on the equilibrium relationship µi t °r f t = pB°∞(1°Fi ). As in the previous calibration
exercise, I set the recovery of consumption during a disaster to B = 0.60 and risk-aversion ∞= 4.
Following Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and Ursua (2013), I also set the probability of a disas-
ter p = 0.028. For the sake of comparison, I compute the realized recovery of each portfolio as
(one minus) the minimum 12-month return over the period December 2007 to June 2009. This
period corresponds to the NBER recession that encompassed the financial crisis.
Table 9 collects the results of this exercise. The data is loosely in the line with the model,
though there are some interesting discrepancies. For portfolios 3-5, their realized recoveries
during the crisis are higher than the model-implied recovery rates. For instance, the portfolio
with the most disaster risk (portfolio 5) recovers about 49% of its value during the crisis, yet its
12.26% excess return implies that it should only recover 43% of its value. Nevertheless, there is
a natural reason why realized recovery rates may be higher than model-implied recovery rates,
at least for the more disaster risky stocks. During the financial crisis, the U.S. government con-
ducted unprecedented interventions into capital markets. In turn, government bailouts likely
put a lower bound on losses for disaster risky firms (e.g. financials), thereby inflating their re-
alized recovery rates. Nakamura, Steinsson, Barro, and Ursua (2013) also argue that realized
prices during disasters are likely to be distorted given that governments typically implement
various forms of price controls during crisis episodes.
Themore puzzling discrepancy between themodel and the data is for the least disaster risky
portfolio (portfolio 1). This portfolio recovered only 46%of its valuewhereas themodel suggests
it should have recovered 76%. Still, it is likely that this difference is driven by the fact that there
is essentially one risk-factor in themodel, perhaps suggesting that additional risk-factors would
better match the data. Overall though, the magnitudes of the realized recovery rates are at least
roughly consistent with those implied by the model.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of a single factor that drives the cross section of option-implied
jump risk. I use a standard model of rare disasters to interpret this factor as the risk-neutral
probability of a disaster, p§t . From 1996-2014, movements in p§t correspond to well-known
crises, and also forecast declines in economic activity. In addition, I use p§t to show that dis-
aster risk is priced in the cross section of U.S. equities: investors require a premium of 7.6% to
hold disaster risky stocks.
A benefit of my approach is that I estimate time-series variation in p§t by starting from a
non-parametric measure of option-implied tail risk. This is useful because it makes almost
no assumptions on the data a priori, but the weakness is that I am not able to estimate the
average likelihood of a crisis. A natural next step is to apply a structural model of disasters to
the entire cross section of options. For instance, the model in Seo and Wachter (2015) applies
to the aggregate stock market, but one could easily extend it to an arbitrary cross section of
firms. Because the arrival rate of disasters is the same across firms (as shown in this paper),
the number of additional parameters that needs to be estimated is small, effectively one for
each firm. In addition, the cross section of options would add tremendous power in identifying
the parameters of the disaster arrival process itself. This approach should also become more
computationally tractable as computing power continues to increase.25
On the theoretical side, an important outstanding question is what drives time-variation
in the likelihood of a disaster in the first place? In this particular paper, I estimate the risk-
neutral likelihood of a disaster, meaning its time-series movement can be driven by changes
in the physical expectation of a disaster, changes in preferences, or both. In turn, what drives
25Santa-Clara and Yan (2010) estimate a similar model using only S&P 500 options and find the average estima-
tion time to be 2-4 hours. Using options across all strikes and all firms should make the problemmore complex.
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changes to, say, the physical likelihood of a disaster in general equilibrium? A potential answer
could be found by linking the rare disasters literature to research on how financial intermediary
activity impacts capital markets and the real economy. Furthermore, I have also worked out of
a standard rational expectations framework, though it would be interesting to explore whether
changes in p§t are driven by learning, sentiment, or other behavioral explanations.
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Figure 1: Principal Component Analysis of bDi Across Firms



























Notes: This figure displays the results of principal component analysis on the correlation matrix of firm disaster risk measures, bDi , extracted
from option prices. Amonthly time-series of bDi is constructed by taking the within-month average of daily bDi for each firm i . A firmmust have
at least 70% of its daily observation in amonth to be included. Principal component analysis is conducted on the correlationmatrix of monthlybDi . This analysis applies to the set of firms with at least 80% of its monthly observations. The date range is from January 1996 to May 2015.
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Dot Com Bubble Bursts






Notes: This figure displays the first principal component fromapanel of firmdisaster riskmeasures, bDi , extracted fromoptionprices. This factor
is interpreted as p§t , the risk-neutral probability of a disaster. A monthly time-series of bDi is constructed by taking the within-month average
of daily bDi for each firm i . A firm must have at least 70% of its daily observation in a month to be included. Principal component analysis
is conducted on the correlation matrix of monthly bDi . This analysis applies to the set of firms with at least 80% of its monthly observations.
To generate the time-series of the factor, I fill missing data in as their mean. The results are not sensitive to these choices. Full details of the
procedure are contained in Appendix B.6. The date range is from January 1996 to May 2015 and the frequency is monthly.
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Figure 3: Calibrated Disaster-Ø

















B = 0.6; F = 0.6; ∞= 4;√= 2; ±i = 0.05; ¡H ,i = 0.13
Notes: This figure displays the model-implied disaster-Ø’s as a function of firm recovery in a disaster, Fi . Small values of Fi indicate firm i
experiences large losses in a disaster. Large and positive values of Øi indicate that firm i ’s equity returns exhibit positive comovement with
changes in the risk-neutral likelihood of a disaster risk. Disaster-Ø’s are computed according to the expression in Corollary 1. The parameter
values that generate the Øi are listed along the top of the figure.
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Table 1: Correlation Analysis of p§t
Panel A: Correlation Analysis of Levels
p§t DSPX Pt/Et V RPt TEDt V I Xt
p§t 1.00 0.88 -0.23 0.29 0.50 0.85
DSPX 1.00 -0.24 0.40 0.56 0.84
Pt/Et 1.00 -0.01 0.13 -0.11
V RPt 1.00 0.30 0.51
TEDt 1.00 0.50
V I Xt 1.00
Panel B: Correlation Analysis of First Differences
p§t DSPX Pt/Et V RPt TEDt V I Xt LEVt
p§t 1.00 0.69 -0.49 -0.11 0.35 0.63 -0.26
DSPX 1.00 -0.51 0.19 0.39 0.79 -0.26
Pt/Et 1.00 -0.15 -0.26 -0.75 0.11
V RPt 1.00 0.26 0.29 0.42
TEDt 1.00 0.42 -0.12
V I Xt 1.00 -0.14
LEVt 1.00
Notes: This table displays the correlation between p§t and various other financial market variables. The top panel displays correlations in
levels, and the bottom panel displays correlations in first differences. DSPX is the disaster-risk measure defined in Equation (20), computed
for the S&P 500. Pt /Et is the cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (CAPE) for the S&P 500, obtained from Robert Shiller’s website. When first
differencing Pt /Et , I use log-differences. V RPt is the variance risk premium, obtained from Hao Zhou’s website (series EVRP). TEDt is the
TED spread and V I Xt is the VIX volatility index. LEVt is the leverage factor of Adrian et al. (2014). In the top panel, LEVt is excluded because
it represents innovations to intermediary leverage. In addition, LEVt is computed quarterly through 2009Q4, so all correlations with this series
are computed by first averaging monthly measures within each quarter, then first differencing. All other data is monthly and spans January
1996 to May 2015.
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Table 2: The Likelihood of a Disaster and Future Economic Activity
Panel A:¢Unemploymentt+1
Financial Indicator Full Sample Excluding Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Spreadt -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(-0.27) (-0.02) (-0.07) (0.00)
Real FFRt 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.018
(0.58) (0.74) (1.01) (1.12)
Stock Market Returnt -0.017 -0.019 -0.012 -0.014
(-1.87) (-2.11) (-1.19) (-1.33)
p§t 0.065 0.079 0.056 0.081
(5.04) (4.07) (2.02) (2.53)
VIXt -0.017 -0.018
(-0.86) (-0.87)
Adjusted R2 26.0 25.9 5.7 5.6
Panel C:¢Total Capacity Utilizationt+1
Financial Indicator Full Sample Excluding Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Spreadt 0.109 0.110 0.111 0.112
(2.53) (2.67) (2.82) (2.72)
Real FFRt 0.022 0.023 0.008 0.009
(0.73) (0.64) (0.22) (0.23)
Stock Market Returnt 0.048 0.047 0.009 0.008
(1.56) (1.55) (0.40) (0.30)
p§t -0.114 -0.108 -0.093 -0.073
(-4.11) (-1.67) (-1.82) (-0.70)
VIXt -0.008 -0.014
(-0.15) (-0.25)
Adjusted R2 23.0 22.6 16.2 15.8
Panel B:¢ln(Industrial Production)t+1
Financial Indicator Full Sample Excluding Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Spreadt 0.128 0.129 0.135 0.134
(2.67) (2.45) (2.54) (2.48)
Real FFRt 0.098 0.098 0.097 0.096
(1.92) (1.85) (1.71) (1.67)
Stock Market Returnt 0.075 0.075 0.027 0.030
(1.84) (1.96) (0.84) (0.91)
p§t -0.158 -0.156 -0.162 -0.196
(-3.80) (-1.61) (2.14) (-1.44)
VIXt -0.001 0.022
(-0.02) (0.31)
Adjusted R2 25.5 25.2 9.6 9.2
Panel D:¢ln(Manuf. Inventories)t+1
Financial Indicator Full Sample Excluding Crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Term Spreadt 2.141 1.950 2.186 2.142
(3.20) (3.09) (3.50) (3.30)
Real FFRt 1.108 0.878 0.929 0.869
(2.86) (1.60) (1.67) (1.47)
Stock Market Returnt -0.050 0.077 -0.040 0.080
(-0.18) (0.21) (-0.11) (0.21)
p§t -1.597 -2.475 -0.611 -2.081
(8.96) (-3.52) (-0.77) (-1.70)
VIXt 1.063 1.044
(1.41) (1.24)
Adjusted R2 18.6 18.9 19.8 19.9
Notes: This table reports forecasting regressions of the general form ¢Yt+1 = c +P4i=1Øi¢Yt+1°i +Pk ∞k Xk , where Yt+1 denotes an
indicator of economic activity at month t +1. When forecasting the growth of industrial production and the manufacturing inventories index,
Yt is the natural logarithm of each series and ¢Yt is scaled by 100. The unemployment and total capacity utilization series are expressed in
percentages. The Xk variables are as follows: RFFt is the real federal funds rate in month t , computed as the average daily federal funds
rate within month t minus the log-difference of core PCE inflation between month t °1 and t °13. RCRSPt is the excess return of the CRSP
value-weighted index and TSt is the difference between the 10 year and 3 month constant maturity Treasury yield, both measured at the end
ofmonth t . p§t is the estimated likelihood of a disaster inmonth t . All X variables have been standardized to havemean zero and variance one.
Regressions are run at a onemonth frequency. The adjusted R2 statistic is reported in percentages. Standard errors are calculated according to
Newey-West (1987), with lags chosen according to the Newey-West bandwidthmethod and weights according to the Bartlett kernel. t-statistics
for each regression are listed in below point estimates parenthesis. The full sample ranges from April 1996 to April 2015, and the sample
excluding the crisis omits the period of December 2007 to June 2009.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for Equal-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Disaster Risk Betas
Low!High Disaster Risk
1 2 3 4 5
Annualized Excess Return (%) 5.08 8.25 10.53 11.60 12.26
Annualized Volatility (%) 29.37 19.76 17.08 17.28 22.29
Annualized Sharpe Ratio 0.17 0.42 0.62 0.67 0.55
Market Cap ($bn) 2.25 4.29 4.50 3.73 1.47
Disaster Beta 13.63 4.77 1.11 -2.47 -11.52
Avg. Number of Firms 897 896 896 896 897
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for portfolios sorted on disaster risk betas. At the end of eachmonth, eligible stocks are sorted into
5 equal-weighted portfolios according to their disaster risk beta. The betas are constructed in real-time, using weekly data over the previous
year, via the following regression: ri t = ai +Øi¢p§t + ei t . Disaster risk is decreasing in disaster beta, so high disaster risk stocks have the
most negative disaster risk betas. Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares listed on the NYSE, NYSE AMEX, or NASDAQ with a
full set of weekly returns over the previous year and a share price of at least $1. Market capitalization is reported in billions of dollars. Both
market capitalization and disaster risk betas are computed as equal-weighted averages within each quintile. Return data is monthly and spans
February 1997 to December 2014.
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Table 4: Alphas for Equal-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Disaster Risk Betas
Low!High Disaster Risk
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
Annualized Æ (%) -2.97 0.50 3.11 4.48 4.59 7.56
(-1.30) (0.33) (2.13) (2.80) (1.93) (2.35)
CAPM-Ø 1.09 0.89 0.79 0.78 0.88 -0.21
(14.07) (20.68) (21.71) (18.30) (15.04) (-1.93)
Size-Ø 1.03 0.65 0.56 0.55 0.82 -0.21
(19.48) (11.25) (10.93) (8.66) (12.33) (-2.52)
Value-Ø -0.26 0.23 0.38 0.37 0.23 0.49
(-1.62) (3.20) (8.30) (6.45) (2.76) (2.20)
Momentum-Ø -0.31 -0.15 -0.12 -0.16 -0.27 0.04
(-3.38) (-3.12) (-3.90) (-4.02) (-4.79) (0.31)
H0 : All Æ’s = 0 p-value = 1.28%
Notes: This table displays risk-adjusted excess returns (alphas) and risk-factor loadings for portfolios sorted on disaster risk betas. At the end
of each month, eligible stocks are sorted into 5 equal-weighted portfolios according to their disaster risk beta. The betas are constructed in
real-time, using weekly data over the previous year, via the following regression: ri t = ai +Øi¢p§t + ei t . Disaster risk is decreasing in disaster
beta, so high disaster risk stocks have themost negative disaster risk betas. Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares listed on the
NYSE, NYSE AMEX, or NASDAQ with a full set of weekly returns over the previous year and a share price of at least $1. The reported Æ is the
intercept of a time-series regression of excess portfolio returns on the Fama-French factor returns andmomentum factor returns. The reported
Ø’s are the loadings on each respective factor. The Fama-French and momentum factors were obtained from Ken French’s website. Return
data is monthly and spans February 1997 to December 2014. t-statistics are listed below their respective point estimates in parenthesis and are
computed according to Newey-West (1987). The reported p-value corresponds to the joint test that all Æ1 = ...=Æ5 = 0.
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Table 5: Risk-Adjusted Returns for Value-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Disaster Risk Betas
Low!High Disaster Risk
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
Annualized Æ (%) -8.89 -3.39 -0.02 0.84 2.89 11.78
(-3.73) (-2.07) (-0.02) (0.58) (1.35) (3.11)
CAPM-Ø 1.27 0.97 0.82 0.81 1.01 -0.26
(10.58) (19.36) (29.09) (21.45) (14.49) (-1.51)
Size-Ø 0.20 -0.08 0.00 -0.06 0.13 -0.06
(2.34) (-1.26) (0.09) (-1.21) (2.11) (-0.54)
Value-Ø -0.40 -0.03 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.70
(-1.67) (-0.33) (3.77) (3.37) (2.04) (1.86)
Momentum-Ø -0.22 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.09 0.14
(-2.22) (0.24) (-0.94) (-0.80) (-1.08) (0.78)
H0 : All Æ’s = 0 p-value = 0.53%
Notes: This table displays risk-adjusted excess returns (alphas) and risk-factor loadings for portfolios sorted on disaster risk betas. At the end
of each month, eligible stocks are sorted into 5 value-weighted portfolios according to their disaster risk beta. The betas are constructed in
real-time, using weekly data over the previous year, via the following regression: ri t = ai +Øi¢p§t + ei t . Disaster risk is decreasing in disaster
beta, so high disaster risk stocks have the most negative disaster risk betas. Eligible stocks are defined as ordinary common shares listed on
the NYSE, NYSE AMEX, or NASDAQ with a full set of daily returns over the previous quarter and a share price of at least $1. The reported Æ
is the intercept of a time-series regression of excess portfolio returns on the Fama-French factor returns and momentum factor returns. The
reported Ø’s are the loadings on each respective factor. The Fama-French and momentum factors were obtained from Ken French’s website.
Return data is monthly and spans February 1997 to December 2014. t-statistics are listed below their respective point estimates in parenthesis
and are computed according to Newey-West (1987). The reported p-value corresponds to the joint test that all Æ1 = ...=Æ5 = 0.
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Table 6: Alphas for Equal-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Disaster Risk (Daily) Betas
Low!High Disaster Risk
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
Annualized Æ (%) -2.79 0.79 2.44 3.20 3.36 6.16
(-1.23) (0.52) (1.74) (2.01) (1.55) (2.03)
CAPM-Ø 1.19 0.96 0.82 0.74 0.78 -0.41
(15.02) (21.51) (18.85) (19.20) (20.99) (-4.51)
Size-Ø 1.11 0.75 0.57 0.53 0.69 -0.42
(19.07) (15.32) (11.48) (9.60) (8.52) (-4.11)
Value-Ø -0.27 0.21 0.33 0.35 0.14 0.41
(-1.56) (3.14) (6.73) (6.64) (1.99) (2.00)
Momentum-Ø -0.31 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13 -0.28 0.04
(-3.16) (-3.49) (-3.89) (-3.36) (-6.27) (0.34)
H0 : All Æ’s = 0 p-value = 17.4%
Notes: This table displays risk-adjusted excess returns (alphas) and risk-factor loadings for portfolios sorted on disaster risk betas. At the end of
each month, eligible stocks are sorted into 5 equal-weighted portfolios according to their disaster risk beta. The beta for firm i is constructed




t°k +ei t . The disaster-Ø for firm i is
then
P2
k=0Øik . Disaster risk is decreasing in disaster beta, so high disaster risk stocks have themost negative disaster risk betas. Eligible stocks
are defined as ordinary common shares listed on the NYSE, NYSE AMEX, or NASDAQ with a full set of daily returns over the previous quarter
and a share price of at least $1. The reported Æ is the intercept of a time-series regression of excess portfolio returns on the Fama-French factor
returns and momentum factor returns. The reported Ø’s are the loadings on each respective factor. The Fama-French and momentum factors
were obtained fromKen French’s website. Return data is monthly and spans February 1997 to December 2014. t-statistics are listed below their
respective point estimates in parenthesis and are computed according to Newey-West (1987). The reported p-value corresponds to the joint
test that all Æ1 = ...=Æ5 = 0.
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Table 7: Alphas for Value-Weighted Portfolios Sorted on Disaster Risk (Daily) Betas
Low!High Disaster Risk
1 2 3 4 5 5-1
Annualized Æ (%) -7.00 -3.14 -2.51 -0.36 3.03 10.03
(-3.13) (-2.07) (-1.69) (-0.22) (1.52) (3.40)
CAPM-Ø 1.33 1.02 0.89 0.77 0.81 -0.52
(13.98) (19.35) (21.97) (21.07) (16.02) (-4.08)
Size-Ø 0.45 0.08 -0.05 -0.11 -0.03 -0.48
(6.05) (1.58) (-1.03) (-3.21) (-0.45) (-4.32)
Value-Ø -0.41 -0.03 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.62
(-2.13) (-0.60) (4.94) (2.91) (2.08) (2.17)
Momentum-Ø -0.14 -0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.03
(-1.32) (-0.01) (0.70) (0.35) (-1.58) (0.18)
H0 : All Æ’s = 0 p-value = 0.75%
Notes: This table displays risk-adjusted excess returns (alphas) and risk-factor loadings for portfolios sorted on disaster risk betas. At the end of
each month, eligible stocks are sorted into 5 value-weighted portfolios according to their disaster risk beta. The beta for firm i is constructed




t°k +ei t . The disaster-Ø for firm i is
then
P2
k=0Øik . Disaster risk is decreasing in disaster beta, so high disaster risk stocks have themost negative disaster risk betas. Eligible stocks
are defined as ordinary common shares listed on the NYSE, NYSE AMEX, or NASDAQ with a full set of daily returns over the previous year and
a share price greater than $1. The reported Æ is the intercept of a time-series regression of excess portfolio returns on the Fama-French factor
returns and momentum factor returns. The reported Ø’s are the loadings on each respective factor. The Fama-French and momentum factors
were obtained fromKen French’s website. Return data is monthly and spans February 1997 to December 2014. t-statistics are listed below their
respective point estimates in parenthesis and are computed according to Newey-West (1987). The reported p-value corresponds to the joint
test that all Æ1 = ...=Æ5 = 0.
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Notes: The table reports results from regressions of the form yt = c+Ø¢p§t for two different dependent variables. In column (1), yt corresponds
to the realized return of the S&P 500. In column (2), yt is the growth rate of the cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (CAPE) for the S&P
500. All regressions are run at a one month frequency spanning the period of February 1996 to May 2015. The price and CAPE data was
obtained from Robert Shiller’s website. Standard errors are calculated according to Newey-West (1987), with lags chosen according to the
Newey-West bandwidth method and weights according to the Bartlett kernel. t-statistics for each regression are listed in parenthesis. **, *
indicates coefficient is statistically different than zero at the 5 percent and 10 percent confidence level, respectively.
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Table 9: Model-Implied vs. Realized Recovery Rates for Disaster Portfolios






Notes: This table displays model-implied versus realized recovery rates for portfolios sorted on disaster risk betas. Model-implied recovery
rates are computed according to Fi = 1°XRi /(pB°∞), where XRi is the average excess return for portfolio i , p is the probability of disaster, B
is the recovery rate of consumption during disasters, and ∞ is the risk-aversion parameter. Following Nakamura et al. (2013), I set p = 0.028. In
addition, I set B = 0.60, and ∞= 4. The realized recovery rates are computed as one minus the minimum 12-month cumulative return for each
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A Appendix: A Full Model of Rare Disasters
In the Section 2 of the main text, I presented the skeleton of the rare disasters model that I repeatedly
use to interpret my empirical findings. In this appendix, I present amore complete version of themodel,
which is a continuous time generalization of the model in Gabaix (2012).26 To make this appendix rela-
tively self-contained, I repeat many of the primitives in the model that I outlined in Section 2 and then
proceed to compute the important equilibrium quantities.
A.1 Macroeconomic Environment
I begin with an endowment economy inhabited by an infinitely lived representative agent. The endow-
ment follows the stochastic process:27
dCt
Ct°
= gCdt +æCdWC ,t + (Bt °1)d Jt , (4)
where WC ,t is a standard Brownian motion and d Jt is a jump process that represents macroeconomic
disasters. d Jt takes a value of one if a disaster occurs and zero otherwise. The Poisson arrival rate of
disasters is time varying and denoted by pt . Hence, a disaster happens over a small time interval, dt ,
with a probability ptdt . The variable Bt > 0 captures the magnitude of a consumption disaster when it
occurs. For example, a value ofBt = 0.8means thatwhen a disaster occurs, aggregate consumption drops
by 20%. I further assume that the intensity process describing disaster arrivals, pt , is independent of the
magnitude of a disaster, Bt . The Brownian motionWC ,t is independent of d Jt and Bt , which means that
in the absence of disasters (i.e. normal times) consumption growth is i.i.d log-normal with a volatility of
æC .
I assume the representative agent has recursive preferences as in Epstein and Zin (1989) and Duffie
and Epstein (1992). The main advantage of recursive preferences is the ability to decouple the agent’s
elasticity of intertemporal substitution, √, from risk aversion, ∞. In a discrete time setting, Epstein and











where ¬= (1°1/√)/(1°∞) and RC ,t+ø is the gross return of a claim to aggregate consumption between t
and t +ø. Here, Ω captures the rate of time preference of the agent. When solving the model, I obtain the
stochastic discount factor by taking the continuous time limit of Equation (5), i.e. as ø& 0.
26Like Gabaix (2012), I take repeated advantage of the linearity-generating (LG) class of stochastic process pio-
neered by Gabaix (2009), which the reader should refer to for a more detailed exposition of LG processes.
27To be precise,Ct° denotes lims"t Cs .
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A.2 Setup for Stocks




= giDdt +dNDi t + (Fi t °1)d Jt (6)
The dividend growth shock NDi t is a martingale so that Et
£
dNDi t
§ = 0 and is independent of the disaster
event. The higher moments of NDi t are left unspecified for now. As we will see shortly, only the first
moment of dNDi t is important for determining the level of asset prices. In normal times, dividends grow
at an expected rate of giD , but if there is a disaster, the stock dividend experiences an additional shock,
Fi t . Fi t > 0 captures how much dividends recover during a disaster. For instance, if Fi t = 0.9, then
dividends drop by 10% when a disaster arrives. Firms with high values of Fi t therefore perform better
during a crisis.
In order to compute equilibrium, we must put more structure on the arrival rate of disasters (pt ),
the recovery rate of disasters at the macroeconomic level (Bt ), and the dividend recovery rate during a
disaster (Fi t ). Oneway to accomplish this is tomodel the dynamics of pt , Bt , and Fi t separately. Wachter
(2013) is one example of this approach, as she models pt as a Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) process.
Alternatively, Gabaix (2012) models the dynamics of pt , Bt , and Fi t jointly, which I adopt in continuous
time here. I do so through a variable called resilience, Hit , which summarizes how a firm is expected to
perform if a disaster occurs over the next instant, dt . I define stock i ’s resilience exactly as in Equation
(31) in Appendix C; however, in Appendix C I also show that a very good approximation that is more









It is easy to see that firms that are expected to perform well in a disaster (i.e. firms whose dividends
recover a lot) have high values of Fi t , and thus are high resilience stocks. For ease of notation, I drop the
limit notation of Et° and replace it by Et , except when it is necessary to distinguish the two.
Resilience itself is modeled as a linearity generating (LG) process as in Gabaix (2009). Linearity gen-
erating processes behave, in an approximate sense, like an AR(1) process. The distinction between an
LG process and an AR(1) process is subtle; however, LG processes are useful in economics because they
deliver linear expressions for equilibrium price-dividend ratios without needing log-linearizations. As is
common inmacroeconomics, I further decompose resilience into a long-runmean, Hi§, and deviations
from that mean, Hˆi t :
Hit =Hi§+ Hˆi t (8)
In turn, firm i ’s resilience (deviations frommean) evolves according to the following stochastic differen-
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tial equation:28
dHˆi t = °¡H ,i Hˆi t d t ° Hˆ2i t d t +dNHi t
º °¡H ,i Hˆi t d t +dNHi t (9)
whereNHi t is amartingale. It is easy to now see the relationship between an AR(1) process and an LG pro-
cess. The term °¡H ,i Hˆi t d t would be present in the continuous time analogue of an AR(1) process, and
so ¡H ,i determines the speed of mean reversion for the resiliency process. It is sensible that resilience
should behave similarly to an AR(1) process— if a firm has high resilience today, it is likely that resilience
tomorrow is also high. The “extra” term, °Hˆ2i t d t , is unique to the LG class, and in practice is quite small
because Hˆi t captures deviations from the mean of resilience. As noted in Gabaix (2009), there are re-
strictions on the variance of the noise process dNHi t that ensure prices remain positive. In Appendix C.3,
I provide one example of a process that satisfies the restrictions and is also internally consistent with the
rest of the model. With the primitives of the model now specified, I now turn to analyzing equilibrium
asset prices in this economy.
A.3 Equilibrium Stock Prices and Returns
Theorem 1 solves for equilibrium price-dividend ratios.
Theorem1. Define ±= Ω+gC/√ and ±i = ±°giD°Hi§ . ±i can be interpreted as a stock’s effective discount










Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
The equilibrium price-dividend ratio given by Equation (10) has a very intuitive form. First consider
what determines the stock’s effective discount rate, ±i . All else equal, firms with a high level of average
resilience, Hi§ , have a low discount rate and therefore a higher valuation ratio. This resultmakes sense as
these are the firms whose dividend growth is expected to recover more during a disaster. Similarly, when
a firm’s resilience is above average (i.e. Hˆi t > 0), its valuation ratio will be above average. Since resilience
mean reverts, this generatesmean-reversion in the price-dividend ratio and hence predictability in stock
prices. Naturally, a stock with a high level of resilience has a low equity premium (and a high price-
dividend ratio); thus, high valuation ratios forecast lower subsequent returns, as we see in the data.
A natural quantity of interest that derives from the equilibrium price dividend ratio in Equation (10)
is the equilibrium return process for firm i ’s stock. This can be computed under two different probability
measures. The first is the physical measure, which corresponds to the actual distribution of return real-
izations. The second is the so-called risk-neutral measure, which weights states of nature according to
marginal utility in those states. Naturally, states in whichmarginal utility is high (i.e. disaster states) have
28To be precise, the following specification ignores covariance of the SDFwith resilience shocks in normal times.
See Section C for the version of the model where this is not the case.
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a higher risk-neutral likelihood than a physical likelihood. Intuitively, risk-neutral probabilities are just
Arrow-Debreu state prices, appropriately normalized so that they correspond to a probability measure.
The risk-neutral likelihood will prove useful when examining the structure of option prices implied by
the disaster economy. The following proposition characterizes firm-level returns under both measures:
Theorem 2. Given the equilibrium price-dividend ratio in Equation (10), the process for dividends in
Equation (6), and the process for resilience in Equation (9), equilibrium returns for firm i evolve as follows:
dPi t
Pi t°
=µi t d t +æi t dWit + (Fi t °1)d Jt (11)
where µi t and æi t are defined in Equation (35), and dWit is a Brownian motion.
Next, let the superscript § denote a stochastic process under the risk-neutral measure Q. The measure
Q is defined formally by Equation (41). Then the risk-neutral return process evolves according to:
dP§i t
P§i t
= r f td t +æi t dW §i t °ptEt
£
B°∞t (Fi t °1)
§
dt + (Fi t °1)d J§t (12)
where r f t is the risk-free short rate process given by Equation (38). The process dW §i t is a Brownianmotion





. Furthermore, the expected excess return of the firm is, to a leading order, given by:
µi t ° r f t = ptEt
£
B°∞t (1°Fi t )
§
(13)
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.3 and C.4.29
The first thing to note fromTheorem2 is the likelihood of a disaster under both probabilitymeasures.
When disasters are negative shocks to the economy (Et [Bt ] < 0), then the risk-neutral probability of a
disaster is greater than the actual likelihood of a disaster, i.e. ptEt
£
B°∞t
§ > pt . This occurs because the
risk-averse agent prices assets as if disasters are more likely than they actually are in nature. In addition,
Theorem 2 states that the risk premium of firm i is decreasing in Fi t . Intuitively, firms that are expected
to do poorly in a disaster require higher expected returns in equilibrium. This is a testable hypothesis
that I explore in Section 4.
A.4 The Risk-Neutral Disaster Intensity
The jump component in the risk-neutral return process is itself the product of a firm specific variable,
(1°Fi t ), and an economywide variable, d J§t . One of the primary contributions of this paper is to estimate
time-series variation in the arrival rate of d J§t using options data. My strategy in themain text uses more
sophisticated option pricing theory, however I beginwith a simple example to develop the basic intuition
of my approach.
29Implicit in this proof is the assumption that the shocks dNHi t and dN
D
i t are themselves governed by Brownian
motions. Theorem 1 requires dNHi t and dN
D
i t to be mean-zero shocks, which holds true under this assumption.
See Appendix C.3 for a specific example where all of these conditions are met.
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A Simplified Example
Consider the simplest case where the volatility of firm returnsæi , the arrival rate of disasters p, the sever-
ity of disasters B , and firm performance in a disaster Fi are all constants. In addition, suppose that we
write a call and put option on firm i with a maturity of ¢, where ¢ is a small unit of time. The following
proposition provides a simple expression for option prices in this stylized example.
Proposition 2. Suppose that æi t = æi ,pt = p,Bt = B , and Fi t = Fi are all constants. For a small time
interval, ¢, define p§ ¥ pB°∞¢. Then options written on a stock with spot price Pi t , strike K , volatility æi ,
and maturity ¢ are approximately given by:
P i (Pi t ,K ) = µi £
£
p§ £P BSi (FiPi t ,K )+ (1°p§)£P BSi (Pi t ,K )
§
Ci (Pi t ,K ) = µi £
£
p§ £C BSi (FiPi t ,K )+ (1°p§)£C BSi (Pi t ,K )
§
(14)
whereP BSi (X ,K ) is the Black-Scholes value of a put option with underlying price X , strike K , volatilityæi ,
maturity ¢, and interest rate 0. µi is a firm level constant, µi = e°p§(1°Fi ).
Proof. See Appendix C.5.
Under these simplifying assumptions, the value of a put (or call) is the probability weighted average
of two components: (i) a Black-Scholes option with an initial price FiPi t and (ii) a Black-Scholes option
with an initial price Pi t . Intuitively, when there is no disaster, stock prices are log-normal and hence take
their usual Black-Scholes form. When there is a disaster, stock prices are still log-normal, but the initial
price is multiplied by Fi because this is the stock price after the disaster occurs. The contribution of each
component to the total put price depends on the risk-neutral likelihood of a disaster.
Now assume that the firm is expected to fall in value in a disaster so that Fi < 1. Next, consider
the following option portfolio: (i) purchase 1 unit of an out-of-the-money put option with moneyness
mPut ¥KPut/Pi t < 1; and (ii) sellmPut units of an out-of-the-money call optionwithmoneynessmCall =
m°1Put ¥ KCall/Pi t > 1. For instance, if mPut = 0.9 and Pi t = 100, then the portfolio purchases one unit
of a put option at strike 90, and sell 0.9 units of a call option at strike 100£ (0.9)°1 = 111. This particular
portfolio is special because it isolates the disaster component of the put option. The argument proceeds
in two steps.
First, observe that a good approximation of the call price is Ci (Pi t ,KCall ) º µi (1° p§)C BSi (Pi t ,K ).
The approximation is valid because the call will have virtually no value in the disaster state; the option
effectively expires out of the money since the stock price drops during a disaster. In turn, all of the call
option value comes from “normal-times” risk.
Second, it is easy to show that for KCall and KPut defined above, the following relation holds for a
Black-Scholes put and call with a zero interest rate: P BSi (Pi t ,KPut )=mPut £C BSi (Pi t ,KCall ). Intuitively
in the Black-Scholes world with a zero interest rate, future risk-neutral returns are symmetric around
zero. Thus, it is possible to find a combination of the Black-Scholes put and the call that exactly offsets
in value.
These two observations imply that the value of the option portfolio isolates the disaster component
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of the put option:
P i (Pi t ,KPut )°mPut £Ci (Pi t ,KCall ) = µi p§P BSi (FiPi t ,KPut )
KPut = mPutPi t , mPut < 1
KCall = m°1PutPi t
In practice, this portfolio resembles what is typically called a “risk-reversal”. The call option in the port-
folio exactly offsets the value of the put that comes from normal-times risk, leaving only the disaster
component of the put option. This stylized example is designed to provide some economic intuition as
to why it is possible to use a portfolio of options to learn about the disaster states of the world. I turn now
to showing that this is possible when risk-neutral returns followmore a general process, such as the one
implied by the model in Equation (12).
TheMore Complex Version
To develop my full estimation strategy, first define the risk-neutral expected quadratic variation of the
log firm stock process from the period [t , t +ø] as:








ln2(v) fi (v ; t )dv
1ApsEt £B°∞s §ds
35
where fi (F ; t ) is the probability distribution function of Fi at time t . Simply put, quadratic variation
captures any expected squared price movements. This includes price movements that come from the
diffusive portion of returns (normal-times risk) and the jump portion of returns (disaster risk). Bakshi,
Kapadia, and Madan (2003) show how to use observed option prices to form an estimate of QV. The
details of this procedure are contained in Section B.1.
Of course, there are many other measures of price variability that can be estimated from option
prices. Perhaps the most popular is the so-called VIX index, which is formally defined as:










At first glance, this definition of the VIX may seem a bit obscure. Indeed, as shown by Britten-Jones and
Neuberger (2000), when the underlying return process does not have discontinuities,Vi t (ø)=QVi t (ø). It
is also easy to see from its definition that the absence of jumps implies quadratic variation— and hence






. This argument underlies the usual interpretation of the VIX as a
measure of variability.
Nonetheless, it is well-known that the VIX is a biased estimate of quadratic variation when the return
process does contain jumps. In fact, Carr and Wu (2009) and Du and Kapadia (2013) show how one
can use this bias to isolate the jump component of returns. Theorem 3 collects the theory behind these
results more precisely (Section B.1 contains the empirical implementation).
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Theorem3. LetQVi t (ø) be the quadratic variation, andVi t (ø) be defined as in Equation (15). Then, inside
the rare disasters model, the following holds true:
Di t (ø) ¥ QVi t (ø)°Vi t (ø)
= ™° fi (F ; t )¢£p§t (ø) (16)
where™
°
fi (F ; t )
¢






. fi (F ; t ) is the
probability distribution function of the firm jump size, Fi t , at time t . Furthermore, when Fi t is constant,
then the expression reduces to:
Di t (ø)= 2£
©
1+ ln(Fi )+ [ln(Fi )]2 /2°Fi
™£p§t (ø) (17)
Proof. The proof can be found in Appendix C.6.
When it is clear, I suppress the arguments Di t (ø) and denote it by Di t for notational convenience.
Similarly, I denote p§t (ø) by p§t and when the distribution of Fi t is time-invariant I use™i to simplify the
expression for™
°
fi (F ; t )
¢
.
Theorem 3 says that all cross-sectional variation in Di t is generated by cross-sectional heterogeneity
in the distribution of Fi t . The reason is that p§t is common across all firms in the economy. Furthermore,
when the distribution of Fi t is time-invariant — Fi t can still be stochastic — then time-series variation
inDi t for all firms will be driven by a common factor p§t . This last observation is the core ofmy empirical
strategy.
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B Appendix: Data Details and Variable Construction
This appendix provides a detailed description of how I construct all the data used in the main text.
B.1 EstimatingDi t
Equation (16) defines Di t (ø) as the difference between (risk-neutral) expected quadratic variation and
theVIX. FollowingDuandKapadia (2013), I estimate both quadratic variation and theVIXusing observed
option prices.30
To start, Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003) show that a good approximation of expected quadratic
variation can be formed using the observed prices of out of the money puts and calls for firm i :31
dQVi t (ø) = er f tøø
264 ˆ
K>Pi ,t
2(1° ln(K /Pi t ))
K 2







2(1° ln(K /Pi t ))
K 2
P i t (Pi t ;K ,ø)dK
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°m2i t ,ø (18)
where Ci t (Pi t ;K ,ø) is the price of a call option written on firm i , on date t , at strike K , and with a time
to maturity of ø. P i t (Pi t ;K ,ø) defines the analogous put price. Pi t is the current spot price of the firm.
mit ,ø is generally a small adjustment term and is defined fully in Equation (39) of Bakshi, Kapadia, and
Madan (2003). Finally r f t is the annualized risk-free rate over the life of the option. The ·ˆ superscript is
used to denote empirical estimates from their theoretical counterparts.
In parallel, I use what is by now a standard formula to estimate the VIX:32



















er f tø°1° r f tø
¢§
(19)
Finally, combining Equations (18) and (19) yields the desired estimator for Di (Pi ; t , t +ø):
bDi t (ø)=dQVi t (ø)° bVi t (ø) (20)
30There is a large options literature on estimating risk-neutral expected quadratic variance and integrated vari-
ance under a variety of return specifications. A non-exhaustive list includes Bakshi, Kapadia, and Madan (2003),
Carr andMadan (2001), Pan (2002), andMartin (2013).
31The approximation error between Equation (18) and actual quadratic variation is related to the stochasticity
of the drift of the log-return. This error goes to zero as time shrinks to zero, which is why I will consider relatively
short dated options (30 day) in my empirical work.
32The formula I present comes from Du and Kapadia (2013).
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where I am now using the ·ˆ to emphasize estimates from data.
In terms of quantities within the model, the results from Du and Kapadia (2013) imply that bDi t (ø)
actually corresponds to an estimate for:33
bDi t (ø)= ™i
ø
£p§t (ø) (21)
where I have assumed again that the distribution for Fi t is time-invariant. Note that the only difference
between Equation (21) and Equation (2) is the annualizing constant ø, which does not impact the factor
analysis.
To actually construct eachfirm’sDi t (ø), I proceed as follows. First, for eachmaturity that is available, I
compute the associated risk-free rate via linear interpolation over the zero-coupon yield curve provided
OptionMetrics. For each option maturity ø, I require at least two OTM put and two OTM call options,
which ensures some degree of symmetry when integrating over option prices.34 Next, I use numerical
integration to evaluate Equations (18) and (19), which I then combine to compute Di t (ø) from Equation
(20). This procedure is executed for each available maturity. Finally, I compute a Di t (ø = 30 days) by
linearly interpolating between the Di t (ø) for maturities that straddle 30 days.
B.2 Constructing Daily bDi t for Each Firm
In order to construct the option basedmeasures used in the paper, I first downloaded the entire Option-
sMetrics database at a daily frequency from 1/4/1996 to 5/28/2015. I also use the underlying security
information and the risk-free rate curves from this same source.
Dividends When I consider options written on individual equity options, they are all American op-
tions. As such, there are a number of standard no-arbitrage restrictions on transaction prices that are
particular to American options. Most of these include some discounting of the dividend yield. One way
to throw out “spurious” option prices that violate these arbitrage restrictions is to use the dividend yields
provided by OptionsMetrics and then check the bounds exactly. As I argue below, in practice accounting
for the effect of dividends on the early exercise feature of options is a nonissue. All of the arguments
regarding dividend considerations apply to the index options in my sample as well.
Risk-Free Rates For a given date, I use the risk-free rate curve provided by OptionsMetrics. This has
the continuously compounded zero-coupon risk-free yield at discretely placed terms. To compute the
continuously compounded riskless rate for a given term, I use: (i) linear interpolation if the terms falls
within the range of terms provided by OptionsMetrics or (ii) I use the rate associated with nearest pro-
vided term for terms outside of the minimum or maximum term provided. For instance, if the lowest
33To be precise, this particular estimate ignores the contribution of the stochastic drift term. As shown in Du
and Kapadia (2013) the “extra” terms are largely a function of the squared expected stochastic drift. For the short
maturity options I consider in this paper, they then show via simulations that ignoring the stochasticity of the drift
is innocuous. See Section 3.4 in Du and Kapadia (2013) for more details.
34Additional option pricing filters can be found in Appendix B.
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term provided is for 15 days, I use the 15-day rate for all terms between 1-14 days. If the riskless rates on
a given date are not available, I use the most recently available set of discount rates.
B.3 First Pass Filter of the Data
I retain only options that meet all of the following criteria listed in Table 10. In addition, I list a succinct
reason for each filter, as well as examples in the literature that apply the same types of filter. The operator
PV (·) denotes the present value of its argument. Ci (t ,ø;K ) andP i (t ,ø;K ) denote the price, at time t , of
a call and put that expire at time t +ø, with strike K , respectively. The subscript i refers to firm i . Di (t ,ø)
is the dividend, if any, of the firm between date t and date t +ø. The price I use for both calls and puts is
the mid-point of the bid and the ask price. Pi t is the price of the underlying firm (or index) at time t .
A few of the filters are worth further discussion:
• Satisfying the condition that Ci (t ,ø;K ) ∏max(0,Pi t °PV (K )°PV (Di (t ,ø))) is trivial. I only con-
sider OTM call options. For reasonable discount rates, then Pt °PV (K ) will already be negative
and the relationship is already satisfied. Subtracting out the present value of future dividends
doesn’t change this fact.
• The constraint that P i (t ,ø;K ) ∏ max(0,PV (K )+PV (Di (t ,ø))°Pi t ) is also rather harmless. For
out of the money put options, and short enough maturity puts, PV (K )°Pt º K °Pi t < 0. Unless
the dividend over the life of the option is very large, then max(0,PV (K )+PV (Di (t ,ø))°Pi t ) = 0.
In this case, discarding put options with non-zero mid-quotes is enough to satisfy the condition.
Even with a dividend payment, it is unlikely it is so large so as to affect the results materially. Thus,
I can safely ignore this restriction, particularly sincemy use of options is not for a directly tradable
strategy.
After eliminating options on an individual basis, I then apply one additional filter based on all options
for a firm and date. Namely, I require that there are at least two OTM put and two OTM call for each
firm. Previous research using options data, e.g. Dennis and Mayhew (2002), show that more symmetry
in terms of the number of observed calls/puts delivers better properties of implied volatility surfaces.
B.4 BuildingMeasures ofdQV and bV
In order to build my estimator of disaster risk, I need to build option-basedmeasures of quadratic varia-
tion and integrated variance. In theory, these measures require observations over an infinite continuum
of strikes (in order to integrate over R+). In practice this is of course not feasible. Following what has
become standard practice, I adopt the samemethodology that is used to construct the VIX, but I modify
it to compute other higher moment estimators that I am interested in.35
I use only observed option prices to compute the integrals in Equations (18) and (19). All integrals
are computed numerically using trapezoidal integration. For American options, Bakshi, Kapadia, and
35The exactmethodology can be found at https://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf. To incorporate differ-
ent moment estimators, I simply alter their Equation (1) to have the appropriate formula. The only modification I
make to their formula is with regard to the forward price used in formulas.
61
Madan (2003) show that ignoring the early-exercise premium is innocuous for short maturity options.
Like with the construction of the CBOE’s VIX, I begin by computingmymetrics for two differentmaturity
options. Specifically, I find the set of options that is nearest, but less than, 30 days to maturity (i.e. ø1 <
30). For these maturity options, I compute my higher moment estimators (e.g. dQVi t (ø1), etc.).
Next, I find the set of options that is nearest, but greater than, 30 day days to maturity (i.e. ø2 > 30).
For these maturity options, I compute my higher moment estimators (e.g. dQVi t (ø2), etc.).
Finally, I compute an estimate of the “30 day” implied estimator (e.g. dQVi t °ø= 30 days¢) via linear
interpolation.36 If there is not a set of options with expiration below or above 30 days, I treat the available
estimator as the 30 day estimate. For instance, if there are only 44 day options available (but not 16 day
options), then I use the estimate coming from the 44 day options. I do not include any options whose
maturity is below 7 days. The end result is a panel of 30-day implied bDi t for 6,762,860 firm-day pairs.
B.5 Aggregating Daily bDi t toMonthly bDi t
To smooth possiblemeasurement errors in daily option prices, I create amonthly bDi t for each firmbased
on their daily measure. Specifically, for a given month and firm i , I take a within-month average of
firm i ’s daily bDi t . To be included in the analysis, I require that each firm has at least 70% of its daily
observations available for that month. This monthly panel of bDi t is what I use to conduct principal
component analysis and extract mymonthly measure of p§t , which I detail next.
B.6 Constructing an Estimate of p§t Using the Full Dataset
The next task is to conduct principal component analysis (PCA) on the monthly panel of bDi t . To do so, I
use standard PCA analysis on the correlation matrix of bDi t . Specifically, the first principal component is
first eigenvector ∫ of the correlation matrix.
The usual extraction method for PCA is to multiply the T £N panel of standardized bDi t by ∫. By
standardized, I mean that each firm’s bDi t is adjusted to have a mean zero and variance of one. I use a
slightly modified procedure to extract the factor. Let me first describe it, then provide the rationale for
this alternative.
I use the eigenvector ∫ to define a set of weights,!. Thus, !i for firm i is simply ∫i /
P
∫i , where ∫i is
the i th element of ∫. I then compute the factor as:
bp§t = µDˆ!
where Dˆ is the N £T panel of bDi t . µ = si gn(cor relation(Dˆ!,D¯t )). Here, D¯t is the average bDi t across all
firms at each point in time.
The rationale for this construction is to maintain the units of p§t . This is useful when mapping a
calibrated version of the model to the data. In addition, because eigenvectors are identified up scalar,
multiplying by µ simply ensures that the extracted factor is positively (not negatively) correlated with the
average disaster risk in the economy. This is a sensible assumption. Constructing bp§t in this way does not
materially impact the results, as the factor created from standard PCA is over 95% correlated with this
36See page 5 in the CBOE’s VIX White Paper.
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bp§t . This is also not surprising given that I am using the “usual” principal component factor loadings to
instead create a weighted average.
In themodel, this means that p§t is just a weighted average of firm-level disaster risk (consistent with







where bp§t is the estimate from the data and p§t is themodel counterpart. It is easy to see herewhy taking a
weighted-average of firm-level disaster risk is appealing: the resulting estimate is p§t times the economy
wide average™i .
B.7 Constructing a Rolling Estimate of p§t
When forming portfolios that are exposed to disaster risk, it is important to make sure the strategies are
tradable in real-time. In turn, this requires me to compute a real-time measure of p§t . I call this real-
time variable a rolling measure of p§t , and at each point in time I use the previous year’s worth of data
to construct it. In addition, I construct a rolling p§t at two frequencies: (i) weekly and (ii) daily. I use
two frequencies (and not the monthly measure described before) so that I have a reasonable about of
observations over which to estimate disaster-Ø’s.
B.7.1 Weekly Frequency
My weekly rolling estimate of p§t derives from the daily panel of bDi t . To fix ideas, consider a particular
date (daily) t for which I want to construct a rolling measure of p§t . I then proceed as follows:
1. Create a subsample of daily bDi t from date t to t °365.
2. Eliminate firms who have less than 95% of their daily observations over the past year.
3. For the remaining firms, take a within week-firm average to compute a weeklymeasure of bDi t over
the past year. Drop any firms who have a missing week (i.e. did not have at least one observation
in a given week).
4. Conduct principal component analysis on this panel of weekly bDi t . Define the rolling estimate of
p§t using the same procedure as in Section B.6, but for this subsample.
I call this estimate p§RW,t , where the subscript RW indicates it is constructed on a rolling basis and at a
weekly frequency.
B.7.2 Daily Frequency
My daily rolling estimate of p§t derives from the daily panel of bDi t . To fix ideas, consider a particular date
(daily) t for which I want to construct a rolling measure of p§t . I then proceed as follows:
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1. Create a subsample of daily bDi t from date t to t °365.
2. Eliminate firms who have less than 95% of their daily observations over the past year.
3. For the remaining firms, fill anymissing datawith data from theprevious day. If this is not possible,
then leave the observation blank. Drop any firms who still have any missing data.
4. Conduct principal component analysis on this panel of daily bDi t . Define the rolling estimate of p§t
using the same procedure as in Section B.6, but for this subsample.
I call this estimate p§RD,t , where the subscript RD indicates it is constructed on a rolling basis and at a
daily frequency.
B.8 Forming Equity Portfolios Based on Disaster-Ø’s
Once I have real-time estimates of p§RW,t and p
§
RD,t , I can now compute real-time disaster-Ø’s. The
disaster-Ø’s at the end of each month are computed using either the previous year’s weekly returns or
the previous quarter’s daily returns.
B.8.1 Disaster-Ø Estimated UsingWeekly Data
Suppose we are standing on date t , which is also the end of the month. The goal is to compute disaster-
Ø’s on which we can form portfolios to hold for the next month. For each firm i , I compute a disaster-Ø




RW,t )£æ(r it )
æ(¢p§RW,t )
where Ω(xt , yt ) is the correlation between x and y using weekly data from t to t°365. æ(x) is the volatility
of x using data over this same horizon. This procedure delivers me a real-time estimate of Øˆi for each
firm and at the end of eachmonth. I compute disaster-Ø’s using weekly data only for firms with a full set
of weekly returns over the previous year.
B.8.2 Disaster-Ø Estimated Using Daily Data
Suppose we are standing on date t , which is also the end of the month. The goal is to compute disaster-
Ø’s on which we can form portfolios to hold for the next month. For each firm i , I compute a disaster-Ø
from daily data using the following regression:






The regression uses daily data from the previous quarter (i.e. t to t °90). I define the disaster-Ø for each
firm and at the end of eachmonth as the sum of the estimated regression coefficients, i.e. Øi =P2k=0Øik .
I compute disaster-Ø’s using daily data only for firms with a full set of daily returns over the previous
quarter.
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B.9 ComputingWeekly andMonthly Returns Using Daily CRSP Data
B.10 Weekly Returns
In order to compute disaster-Ø using weekly data, I need weekly returns for each firm. To do so, I simply
accumulate the daily returns within each week to compute a weekly return. To be considered in this
accumulation, a firmmust have at least 3 observations within each week.
B.11 Monthly Returns
To track portfolio performance, I need a monthly return of each firm. CRSP provides a monthly return,
but return computations are calculated using end of month prices (i.e. the February return is the return
from the endof the previous January to the endof February). This computationwould be fine if portfolios
were formed at the end of eachmonth. However, to really ensure tradability, I estimate disaster-Ø’s at the
end of each month, but then I actually form the portfolios using these betas on the next business day.
For example, suppose we are standing in January 1997. On January 31, 1997, I use the previous year’s
worth of data to estimate disaster-Ø’s. Then, on February 3, 1997 — the first business day after January
31— I form the portfolios. I hold these until February 28, 1997, and then repeat the procedure.
I therefore use CRSP Daily returns to compute a within-month returnmeasure for each firm in CRSP.
To do so, I simply compound daily returns within each month. To be included in the analysis, the last
observation for a firm in a month must be within 5 days of the end of the business month. In addition,
each firm’s first observation in a month must be within 5 days of the first of the business month.
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C Appendix: Model Solution and Proofs
When presenting the model in Appendix A, I use the term “approximate” in describing expressions for
1) the stochastic discount factor, 2) price dividend ratios for the claim to aggregate consumption, and 3)
price dividend ratios for claims to an arbitrary stock. In this appendix I will be precise in describing what
is meant by approximate, and also solve the model exactly. In addition, I provide proofs of the theorems
and propositions in the main text and in Appendix A.
C.1 The Claim to Aggregate Consumption
As is by now standard, a claim to aggregate consumption pays consumption as a dividend. Denote it’s










As with an arbitrary stock, I model the resilience of the consumption claim as HCt = HC§ + HˆCt , where
HC§ is the long run mean and HˆCt is deviations from that mean. Specifically,
HˆCt = kt + 1°¬2 v
2 (kt )
with the process kt evolving as follows:
dkt =°(¡H ,C +¬kt )ktdt + (±C +¡H ,C +¬kt )
£
(¬°1)v2(kt )dt + v(kt )dWk,t
§
(23)
where Wk,t is a standard Brownian motion. v(kt ) is an arbitrary function that dictates the volatility of
kt and I require only that it goes to zero just before kt hits °¡c/¬. Note that this restriction is not much
different than those put a standard Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1985) process. kt is instead an LG-process
that mean reverts at a speed ¡H ,C . The extra dt terms are small in magnitude and are amodeling conve-
nience that comes with the LG class.
A Comment on the Modeling Approach and How I Use “Approximate” in the Main Text At
this juncture, it may appear confusing why I don’t simply model HCt as an LG process directly, instead
of modeling it as a function of the LG-process kt . The reason is that I eventually want to have a price-
dividend ratio for the consumption claim that is linear in an LG process. It turns out that in order for all
expressions and processes to be internally consistent, there is little freedom from a modeling perspec-
tive. Following with Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Gabaix (2012), I reverse engineered the process
for kt and the definition of HCt to ensure internal consistency. In addition, Gabaix (2012) shows that
the volatility terms are small compared to the “leading” term in kt , meaning HˆCt ' kt , and I adopt this
argument here as well. This is the sense in which I use the phrase “approximate” in themain text. Notice
also that in the power utility case, ¬= 1, and all of the expressions in the main text become exact.
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Guess andVerify Approach I take a “guess and verify” approach to calculate the price-dividend ratio
of the unlevered consumption claim. That is, I will first conjecture an equilibrium price dividend ratio
for the aggregate consumption claim. From this conjecture, I will use the stochastic discount factor to
derive the value of the aggregate consumption claim, and thus confirm that my original conjecture is
true. Along the way, the following Lemma will prove useful:









+ £(1+dRC ,t )1/¬°1°1§
Proof. The proof follows from taking the limit of Equation (5) as ø& 0.37
Next, I conjecture a linear form for the price-dividend ratio of the consumption claim.









, ±C := ±° gC °¬HC§ (24)
where ± := Ω+ gC/√.
Let us now check the internal consistency of this conjecture. The instantaneous return to the aggre-
gate consumption claim is:

























±C +¡H ,C +¬kt °
±C¬ktdt
±C +¡H ,C +¬kt
= dCt
Ct°
+ £±C °¬kt +¬(¬°1)v2 (kt )§dt +¬v (kt )dWk,t (25)
where the last line comes from substituting in for dkt and canceling like terms. For now, define µkt =£
±C °¬kt +¬(¬°1)v2 (kt )
§
. Next, substitute Equation (25) and apply Lemma 1 to compute the evolution
























Then when taking continuous time limits,Ct+ø/Ct °1 converges to dCt/Ct . The second order term is necessary to
account for the standard Ito correction term that appears in stochastic calculus.
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£ °1+dRC ,t ¢1/¬°1 (26)
Our next task is to insert the expression derived for dRC ,t in Equation (25) into the stochastic discount
factor. To do so, we can Taylor expand the last line around zero, and as is standard in stochastic calculus,





































































































































































































































where I eliminated terms containing dWC ,t dWk,t because I assume the two shocks are independent.

























Finally, substituting in for µkt =
£
±C °¬kt +¬(¬°1)v2 (kt )
§
and kt yields, after some simplification:
dMt
Mt












dt ° v(kt )dWk,t
∏
(28)
where I have used the identities ±= Ω° gc/√ and ±c = ±° gc °¬H§C .
Note that in the power utility model, ¬ = 1, which means the stochastic discount factor outside of
disasters takes its usual form (e.g. Cochrane (2005)). Further notice if there is a disaster thatMt is simply










We are now in a position to verify Conjecture 1 using the LGmachinery. From Equation (29) and the law
of motion for consumption, I calculate:
d (MtCt )
Mt°Ct°
= °°±+ (¬°1)HC§¢dt °∞æCdWC ,t + (¬°1)∑µkt + v2(kt )2
∂

















/dt = °±+ (¬°1)
µ
























+ gC +HC§ + HˆCt
= °±+ (¬°1)
µ




+ gC +HC§ +kt + 1°¬2 v
2 (kt )





















= (°±C +¬kt )kt ° (¡H ,C +¬kt )ktdt + (±C +¡H ,C +¬kt )(¬°1)v2(kt )dt
+(±C +¡H ,C +¬kt )(1°¬)v2(kt )dt
= °(±C +¡H ,C )kt









So, indeed Conjecture 1 is correct. It is also worth noting that when the IES is one (i.e. √ = 1), then the
price-dividend ratio of the consumption claim collapses to a constant of Ω°1 as in Weil (1990). Notice























This expression matches the derivation of Equation (13) in Barro (2009).
C.2 Equilibrium Valuation of Any Arbitrary Stock
Similar to the aggregate consumption claim, define the resilience of firm i ’s stock as:
Hit := ptEt
£
B°∞t Fi ,t °1







Further suppose that Hit =Hi§+ Hˆi t , and the variable part of firm-level resilience follows an LG process









dt =°(¡H ,i + Hˆi t )Hˆi td t +dNHi t (32)
where again NHi t is a mean-zero shock to firm-level resilience and
≠
x, y
ÆND denotes covariance of x and
y , conditional on no disasters.
Next, to compute the price-dividend ratio, we need to verify the conditions for Hit to be used in
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conjunction with the LGmachinery. Start with the first LGmoment:
d (MtDi t )
Mt°Dit°




















+(B°∞t+dtFi ,t+dt °1)d Jt




d (MtDi t )
Mt°Dit°
∏
/dt = °±+ (¬°1)
µ







∞(1+∞)dt +ptEt (B°∞t Fi ,t °1)
= °±+ (¬°1)
µ
HC§ +kt + 1°¬2 v
2 (kt )° 1°¬2 v







∞(1+∞)dt +ptEt (B°∞t+dtFi ,t+dt °1)










∞(1+∞)dt +ptEt (B°∞t Fi ,t °1)
= °±+ giD +Hit
= °±+ giD +Hi§ + Hˆi t
= °±i + Hˆi t
















= °°±i + Hˆi t ¢ Hˆi t ° (¡H + Hˆi t )Hˆi t
= °(±i +¡H )Hˆi t











From Equation (33), it is straightforward to derive the equilibrium return process for the firm. Start with
the instantaneous change in the level of prices:
dPi t = 1
±i
∑
dDi t + 1
±i +¡H ,i
°
dDi t Hˆi t +Ditd Hˆi t +
≠
dDi t ,dHˆi t
Æ¢∏
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dDi t + 1±i+¡H ,i
°
dDi t Hˆi t +Ditd Hˆi t +
≠





1+ Hˆi t±i+¡H ,i
¥
=
dDi t + 1±i+¡H ,i
°










































±i +¡H ,i + Hˆi t
∂µ








±i +¡H ,i + Hˆi t
(34)
Substituting Equation (6) and (32) into (34) yields:
dPi t
Pi t
= °giDdt +dNDi t + (Fi t °1)dJt ¢+µ
1
±i +¡H ,i + Hˆi t
∂√










= µi t d t +æi t dWit + (Fi t °1)d Jt (35)
where
µi t = giD °
0B@
°






+ dDitDi t ,dNHi t
END
±i +¡H ,i + Hˆi t
1CA
æi t =
vuutvart (dNDi t )+µ 1±i +¡H ,i + Hˆi t
∂2
vart (dNHi t )
where dWit is a standard Wiener process.
Where did the dWit in Equation (35) come from? Recall that I only restrictedNDi t andN
H
i t to bemean-
zero innovations. Importantly, this was all that was necessary to derive equilibriumprice-dividend ratios
as in Equation (33). The remaining task is to engineer processes forNDt andN
H
t that are based onWiener
processes, have mean zero increments, an also satisfy the restrictions on variance that are required for
LG processes. Here is a sketch of one way to accomplish this: set dNDt =æDi tdWDi t for an arbitrary volatil-
ity process,æDi t . Then, define dN
H
i t =°aNHi t °Æ(NHi t °∏)dW Hi t . This is the process used byMenzly, Santos,
and Veronesi (2004). The parameter a determines the mean-reversion speed of the process and ∏ dic-
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tates the domain of the process so that NHi t 2 [∏,1). Finally, set ∏ equal to the appropriate lower bound
as dictated by the LG restrictions.38
It is also important to recognize that dWit is not necessarily independent of other shocks in the
model. Namely, given the definition of firm resilience, dWit is mechanically correlated with dWkt . As
such, we can decompose dWit as follows: dWit = ΩdWkt +
p
1°Ω2dfWit , where dfWit is an independent
Brownian motion, and Ω is a correlation coefficient that is implicitly determined by the definition of
resilience (both the consumption claim and at the firm level). Putting this all together, we obtain the
following internally consistent process for firm-level returns:
dPi t
Pi t




1°Ω2dfWit∂+ (Fi t °1)d Jt (36)
C.4 Risk-Neutral Price Dynamics
I solve for the risk-neutral price dynamics of any stock in three steps: (i) solve for the equilibrium risk-
less short rate process, rt ; (ii) define the Radon Nikodym derivative from the stochastic discount factor
process; (iii) use Girsanov’s theorem for jumps to solve for risk-neutral price dynamics.
Step (i) is necessary in order to pin down the risk-neutral drift (and thus the excess risk premium)
as a function of the model’s primitives. One reference for Girsanov’s theorem for jumps can be found in
Björk, Kabanov, and Runggaldier (1997).
38Footnote 9 in Gabaix Gabaix (2012) details these restrictions based on how resilience is defined in the disaster
model.
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C.4.1 Equilibrium Short Rate Process
Let me first hone down the (dynamic) short rate rt ,
















































































































where the approximation in the last line comes from ignoring the higher order v2(kt ) term.
Notice that if √ = 1/∞ as in the power utility case, then we get the exact expression in Barro (2009)
for time-invariant disasters and Gabaix (2012) for time-varying disasters. Furthermore, if√= 1, then the
expression matches the risk-free rate derived in Wachter (2013).
C.4.2 Defining the Radon-NikodymDerivative



















= r f td t + dMtMt





















dt ° v(kt )dWk,t
∏
+ °B°∞t °1¢d Jt








dt ° (¬°1)v(kt )dWk,t (40)
It should be clear from Equation (40) that Zt is a martingale under the physical measure, P.






C.4.3 Girsanov’s Theorem to ChangeMeasure
Girsanov’s theorem for jumps, e.g. Kabanov, and Runggaldier (1997), states that the dW §Ct ¥ dWCt +
∞æCdt and dW §kt = dWkt+(¬°1)v(kt )dt are both Brownianmotions under the newmeasureQ. In addi-




. Notice that when Bt < 0, p§t > pt . Intuitively, the agent prices disasters as if they are more likely under
the risk-neutral measure. The severity of disasters at the aggregate level also changes under the risk-
neutral measure. Suppose that the probability distribution function of Bt is given by fBt (x). Under the










It is easy to verify that f §Bt (x) is a valid distribution function. Furthermore, E
Q









With uncertainty under the risk-neutral measure appropriately defined, we can now determine the price
of a consumption claim.
Pricing the Consumption Claim:
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From Equation (25), we know that the return to the consumption claim is:
dRCt = gCdt +æCdWCt +
£
±C °¬kt +¬(¬°1)v2 (kt )
§
dt +¬v (kt )dWkt + (Bt °1)d Jt




§+¬v(kt )£dW §kt ° (¬°1)v(kt )dt§+ (Bt °1)d Jt
= µCtdt °∞æ2Cdt °¬(¬°1)v2(kt )dt +æCdW §Ct +¬v(kt )dW §kt + (Bt °1)d Jt
= µCtdt °∞æ2Cdt °¬(¬°1)v2(kt )dt +æCdW §Ct +¬v(kt )dW §kt + (Bt °1)d Jt
+p§t EQt [Bt °1]°p§t EQt [Bt °1]





dt °p§t EQt [Bt °1]dt
where µCt = gC +
£
±C °¬kt +¬(¬°1)v2 (kt )
§
. Under no arbitrage, we know that under the risk-neutral
measure the expected change in the consumption claim must equal the risk-free rate (i.e. EQt [dRCt ] =
r f t ):




dt = r f td t
,





The expected return on the consumption claim is the sum of three components. The first, ∞æ2C , is the
standard result from power-utility economies, and we know that æC is too small to match expected un-
levered stock market returns on its own. The second term ¬(¬° 1)v2(kt ) arises from Epstein-Zin-Weil
preferences. When the IES √ > 1, then more uncertainty in resilience (the disaster likelihood of sever-
ity) leads to a higher equity premium. This result mirrors the findings of, for instance, Bansal and Yaron
(2003). The last term reflects the additional premium required for bearing disaster risk.39
Pricing an Arbitrary Stock:
39Note that this is the expected return to the consumption claim, conditional on no disasters. This is because
EPt [dRCt ]=µCtdt+ptEPt [Bt °1]dt . The unconditional expected return of the consumption claim is thus given by:






Start from the return process for an individual firm:
dPi t
Pi t
= µi t d t +æi t
µ
ΩdW §kt °Ω(¬°1)v(kt )dt +
q
1°Ω2dfWit∂+ (Fi t °1)d Jt
= µi t d t +æi t
q
1°Ω2dfWit +æi tΩdW §kt °Ω(¬°1)v(kt )æi t d t
+ptEt
£




B°∞t (Fi t °1)
§
dt + (Fi t °1)d Jt
= £µi t +ptEt £B°∞t (Fi t °1)§°Ω(¬°1)v(kt )æi t §dt
+æi t
q
1°Ω2dfWit +æi tΩdW §kt °ptEt £B°∞t (Fi t °1)§dt + (Fi t °1)d Jt (43)
No-arbitrage implies that, under the Q-measure, the discounted stock price is a Martingale. In order for
this to be true, it must be the case that:
µi t +ptEt
£
B°∞t (Fi t °1)
§°Ω(¬°1)v(kt )æi t = r f t
,
µi t ° r f t = Ω(¬°1)v(kt )æi t +ptEt
£




B°∞t (1°Fi t )
§
(44)
where the approximation comes from the fact that v(kt ) is in practice very small.40 Equation (44) is the
equilibrium risk premium for any stock.
Finally, we obtain the risk-neutral return process for the firm:
dP§i t
P§i t
= r f td t °ptEt
£




1°Ω2dfWit +æi tΩdW §kt + (Fi t °1)d J§t
= r f td t °ptEt
£
B°∞t (Fi t °1)
§
dt +æi t dW §i t + (Fi t °1)d J§t (45)
where dW §i t =
p
1°Ω2dfWit +ΩdW §kt . Here, I use the § superscript to denote the appropriate processes
under Q. The important takeaway of this exercise though is the risk-neutral jump process at the firm
level.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 2
First notice that the risk-neutral probability of a disaster over the next ¢ is 1° e°pB°∞¢ º pB°∞¢ = p§.
Under the assumption that æi t = æi ,pt = p,Bt = B , and Fi t = Fi are all constants, the risk-neutral stock












¢+æup¢™ if a disaster occurs
40In addition, if independent innovations to firm-level recovery Fi t are a large component of firm resilience, then
Ω will also be very small.
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where ∫i = r f °pB°∞(1°Fi ) and u is a standard normal random variable under the risk-neutral measure,
u ªQ N (0,1).
Proof. Next, recall that the Black-Scholes formula (with zero interest rate) for puts computes the follow-
ing expectation:








where M is an arbitrary measure such that z ªM N (0,1) is a standard normal under that measure. For
notational ease, I suppress the time to maturity ¢.
Now, in our context, the value of a put option is:
P i (Pi t ,K ) = e°r f ¢EQ [max(0,K °Pt+¢)]
= e°r f ¢
n
p§EQNo°Di sas [max(0,K °Pt+¢)]+ (1°p§)EQDi sas [max(0,K °Pt+¢)]
o
(46)
where EQNo°Di sas[·] is the expectation under the risk-neutral measure, conditional on no disaster occur-
ring. This is straightforward to compute:
E
Q
No°Di sas [max(0,K °Pt+¢)] = EQ
h








max(0,K °Pi t exp
n°°æ2i /2¢¢+æup¢oi
= e∫i¢P BSi (Pi t ,K )
It is straightforward to repeat the same argument to compute EQDi sas [max(0,K °Pt+¢)]. Thus, Equation
(46) reduces to:
P i (Pi t ,K ) = e(∫i°r f )¢
£
p§ £P BSi (FiPi t ,K )+ (1°p§)£P BSi (Pi t ,K )
§
= e(°p§(1°Fi )) £p§ £P BSi (FiPi t ,K )+ (1°p§)£P BSi (Pi t ,K )§
which yields the desired result. A parallel argument holds for the call option value
C.6 Proof of Theorem 3
Define g (v)= ln(v) and√(x)= 1+x+x2/2°ex . As defined in the main text, fi (F ; t ) is the density of F at
time t . Finally, define™( fi (F ; t )) as:
™
°







f (v ; t )dv (47)
The proof follows from applications of Proposition 1 of Carr andWu (2009), and Proposition 2 of Du and
Kapadia (2013).
In the case where Fi is constant, then™ takes a very simple form:
™c (Fi ;∞)= 2
£




C.7 Proof of Proposition 1




































±i +¡H ,i £
°
Hˆi ,t+h ° Hˆi ,t
¢
(49)
where the approximation in the second line comes from a first-order Taylor expansion around Hˆ = 0.
This is a good approximation in this case because the mean of Hˆ is by construction zero.
Next, using the definition of resilience Hˆi t , recognize that:










B°∞t (Fi ,t + (¬°1)Bt )°¬
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B°∞t (Fi ,t + (¬°1)Bt )°¬
§™















§+ (¬°1)Et° hB1°∞t i°¬o (50)
where the second line comes from the assumption that expectations of F and B are constant over short
horizons (in this case h = 1/12), and the third line comes from the assumption that F and B are indepen-
dent.




















§+ (¬°1)Et° hB1°∞t i°¬o
±i +¡H ,i| {z }
¥Ø˜i
(51)
The preceding equation is a regression of returns on dividend growth and changes in pt . The regression







§> 0, ±i > 0, and ¡H ,i > 0.
In practice, the explanatory variable in the regression is p§t+h°p§t , as opposed to pt+h°pt . As in the
main text, I useØi to denote the regression coefficient when using the risk-neutral probability of disaster.




? Thus, because the









Inherently, this proof rests on the assumption that when estimate Øi , the expectations of B and F
stay constant over the estimation horizon. When I implement the procedure empirically, I use trailing
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one-year data to estimate the regression, so this assumption is likely to hold true.
C.8 Proof of Corollary 1
















±i +¡H ,i (52)
Next, recall that our estimate of p§t is multiplied by a scalar ™, which represents the average ™i in the
economy. Recall from the main text that ™i = 2£ (1+ ln(Fi )+ [ln(Fi )]2 /2°Fi ). Thus, my estimate ofbp§t =™p§t .
Under the assumption that pt is constant within each month (ø), it follows that:














































2£©1+ ln(FSP )+ [ln(FSP )]2 /2°FSP™£B°∞ °±i +¡H ,i ¢
C.9 How Big Are the “Higher Order” Terms for Resilience?
In both the definition of firm-level resilience and the resilience of the consumption claim, the “higher
order” terms v2(kt ) appears frequently. If we can ignore this term, then the expressions for the resilience
of the consumption claim is given by Hct = kt °∞(1°∞)æ
2
C
2 . For the case of the consumption claim, this
means that the price-dividend ratio will be exactly linear inHct (as opposed to kt , see expression (24)). In
his Online Appendix, Gabaix (2012) shows v(kt ) is proportional to the volatility of pt , which he calibrates
to æp = 0.4%. In this paper, the only difference between my definition of consumption resilience in (22)
from his same expression is a constant; thus, the analysis of the magnitude v(kt ) is the same, since this
determines the volatility of resilience. Gabaix (2012) finds that, for example, the v(kt ) terms contribute
less than 1% to quantities such as Hct and Hit , and for the same reason, the approximations used in the
main text are a very accurate version of the fully solved model presented in this appendix.
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